Hard Problem
The Hard Problem is the problem of how neurological processes in the brain give rise to the subjective experience and feelings of "I". The hard problem is, according to Chalmers, the "the greatest mystery of the mind"[1]
Related LP Terms
Hard Problem > Consciousness, Strong Theory of Consciousness
Related LP Terms
Hard Problem > Consciousness, Strong Theory of Consciousness
Non-LP Related Terms
Hard Problem > Aspect of Consciousness
Notes
The hard problem, in contrast, is the question of how physical processes in the brain give rise to subjective experience. This puzzle involves the inner aspect of thought and perception: the way things feel for the subject. When we see, for example, we experience visual sensations, such as that of vivid blue. Or think of the ineffable sound of a distant oboe, the agony of an intense pain, the sparkle of happiness or the meditative quality of a moment lost in thought. All are part of what I am calling consciousness. It is these phenomena that pose the real mystery of the mind.[2]
The hard problem of consciousness, in contrast, goes beyond problems about how functions are performed. Even if every behavioral and cognitive function related to consciousness were explained, there would still remain a further mystery: Why is the performance of these functions accompanied by conscious experience? It is this additional conundrum that makes the hard problem hard.[3]
Chalmers provides some ideas on method to study consciousness, though in the end he reduces it to physical processes. He also suggests "information" is a fundamental property of physical creation. "The idea is at least compatible with several others, such as physicist John A. Wheeler's suggestion that information is fundamental to the physics of the universe. The laws of physics might ultimately be cast in informational terms, in which case we would have a satisfying congruence between the constructs in both physical and psychophysical laws. It may even be that a theory of physics and a theory of consciousness could eventually be consolidated into a single grander theory of information." [4]
"But while these inward mystical experiences cannot be pushed to the extreme of being turned into compelling ontological proofs, they nevertheless do offer a very weighty ground for believing that there is a More of Consciousness continuous with our own—a co-consciousness with which our own is bound up, and that constructive influences do come into us from beyond our selves....
"[5]
Footnotes
- ↑ D.J. Chalmers, “The Puzzle of Conscious Experience,” Scientific American 273, no. 6 (1995): 80–86, doi:https://www.consc.net/papers/puzzle.html.
- ↑ D.J. Chalmers, “The Puzzle of Conscious Experience,” Scientific American 273, no. 6 (1995): 80–86, doi:https://www.consc.net/papers/puzzle.html.
- ↑ D.J. Chalmers, “The Puzzle of Conscious Experience,” Scientific American 273, no. 6 (1995): 80–86, doi:https://www.consc.net/papers/puzzle.html.
- ↑ D.J. Chalmers, “The Puzzle of Conscious Experience,” Scientific American 273, no. 6 (1995): 80–86, doi:https://www.consc.net/papers/puzzle.html.
- ↑ Jones, Rufus. Studies in Mystical Religion. London and New York: Macmillan and Co., 1909. Kindle Edition.
