Robert Bellah - Revision history

Michael at 14:00, 8 November 2026

2026-11-08T14:00:08Z

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	* '''Religious Organization'''. Socially, we get for the first time differentiated religious collectivities: "the single religio-political hierarchy of archaic society tends to split into two at least partially independent hierarchies, one political and one religious" (p. 367). A religious elite emerges that "claims direct relation to the transmundane world." (p. 367). This religious elite mirrors and reinforces the social hierarchies. As a four-class system emerges it is reflected by religious systems. A lower-status group (peasants), urban lower class (merchants and artisans), cultural elite (including religious elites), political-military elite.		* '''Religious Organization'''. Socially, we get for the first time differentiated religious collectivities: "the single religio-political hierarchy of archaic society tends to split into two at least partially independent hierarchies, one political and one religious" (p. 367). A religious elite emerges that "claims direct relation to the transmundane world." (p. 367). This religious elite mirrors and reinforces the social hierarchies. As a four-class system emerges it is reflected by religious systems. A lower-status group (peasants), urban lower class (merchants and artisans), cultural elite (including religious elites), political-military elite.
	* As for '''social implications,''' a new level of tension (and potential!) enters history: political acts "could be judged in terms of standards that the political authorities could not finally control" (prophet vs. king, pope vs. emperor), and religion comes to provide "the ideology and social cohesion for many rebellions and reform movements" — a "more dynamic and especially a more purposive role in social change" (p. 368) — while continuing for long periods to legitimate the existing order. "Religion... provided the ideology and social cohesion for many rebellions and reform movements in the historical civilizations, and consequently played a more dynamic and ... purposive role in social change...." (p. 368). This was only a possibility because '''"in most of the historic civilizations for long periods of time religion performed...legitimization and reinforcement of the existing social order." (p. 368).'''		* As for '''social implications,''' a new level of tension (and potential!) enters history: political acts "could be judged in terms of standards that the political authorities could not finally control" (prophet vs. king, pope vs. emperor), and religion comes to provide "the ideology and social cohesion for many rebellions and reform movements" — a "more dynamic and especially a more purposive role in social change" (p. 368) — while continuing for long periods to legitimate the existing order. "Religion... provided the ideology and social cohesion for many rebellions and reform movements in the historical civilizations, and consequently played a more dynamic and ... purposive role in social change...." (p. 368). This was only a possibility because '''"in most of the historic civilizations for long periods of time religion performed...legitimization and reinforcement of the existing social order." (p. 368).'''
	'''Early Modern religion''' — a representation marked by "the collapse of the hierarchical structuring of both this and the other world" (p. 368). Dualism remains, but as direct confrontation: much of the cosmological baggage is dropped "as superstition," and the stress falls on faith, "an internal quality of the person," over acts marked "religious" (p. 369). The religious action this stimulates is world-affirming: "salvation is not to be found in any kind of withdrawal from the world but in the midst of worldly activities" (p. 368); indeed "religious action was now conceived to be identical with the whole of life" (p. 369), the service of God as "a total demand in every walk of life." Socially, the Reformation rejects both papal authority and the old two-level religious hierarchy, replacing it with a new two-class system of "elect and reprobates" — a vanguard group rather than a qualitative religious elite (p. 369) — while church and state lose their reified standing in favor of "a more flexible multi-centered mode of social organization based more on contract and voluntary association" (p. 370). As for ''social implications,'' "for the first time pressures to social change in the direction of greater realization of religious values are actually institutionalized as part of the structure of the society itself" (p. 370) — the self-revising, voluntaristic, democratic social order.		'''Early Modern religion''' — Only one religion fits this category, Protestantism. Here we find a representation marked by "the collapse of the hierarchical structuring of both this and the other world" (p. 368). Dualism remains, but as direct confrontation: much of the cosmological baggage is dropped "as superstition," and the stress falls on faith, "an internal quality of the person," over acts marked "religious" (p. 369). The religious action this stimulates is world-affirming: "salvation is not to be found in any kind of withdrawal from the world but in the midst of worldly activities" (p. 368); indeed "religious action was now conceived to be identical with the whole of life" (p. 369), the service of God as "a total demand in every walk of life." Socially, the Reformation rejects both papal authority and the old two-level religious hierarchy, replacing it with a new two-class system of "elect and reprobates" — a vanguard group rather than a qualitative religious elite (p. 369) — while church and state lose their reified standing in favor of "a more flexible multi-centered mode of social organization based more on contract and voluntary association" (p. 370). As for ''social implications,'' "for the first time pressures to social change in the direction of greater realization of religious values are actually institutionalized as part of the structure of the society itself" (p. 370) — the self-revising, voluntaristic, democratic social order.

	'''Modern Religion''' — a representation marked by "the collapse of the dualism that was so crucial to all the historic religions" (p. 371). After Kant, "it is not so much a question of two worlds as it is of as many worlds as there are modes of apprehending them"; "an infinitely multiplex one has replaced the simple duplex structure" (p. 371), and religion must be grounded "in the structure of the human situation itself" (p. 371). The religious action this stimulates is the search for meaning beyond any church: "the search for adequate standards of action, which is at the same time a search for personal maturity and social relevance, is in itself the heart of the modern quest for salvation" (p. 373). Socially, organization becomes radically fluid and voluntary — Thomas Paine's "My mind is my church," Jefferson's "I am a sect myself" (p. 373) — with doctrinal enforcement dropped and the church reduced to providing "a favorable environment" in which "each individual must work out his own ultimate solutions... without imposing on him a prefabricated set of answers" (p. 373). As for ''social implications,'' culture and personality themselves "have come to be viewed as endlessly revisable" (p. 373) — which can be read as the collapse of meaning, or, as Bellah argues "more fruitfully," as "unprecedented opportunities for creative innovation in every sphere of human action" (p. 374).		'''Modern Religion''' — a representation marked by "the collapse of the dualism that was so crucial to all the historic religions" (p. 371). After Kant, "it is not so much a question of two worlds as it is of as many worlds as there are modes of apprehending them"; "an infinitely multiplex one has replaced the simple duplex structure" (p. 371), and religion must be grounded "in the structure of the human situation itself" (p. 371). The religious action this stimulates is the search for meaning beyond any church: "the search for adequate standards of action, which is at the same time a search for personal maturity and social relevance, is in itself the heart of the modern quest for salvation" (p. 373). Socially, organization becomes radically fluid and voluntary — Thomas Paine's "My mind is my church," Jefferson's "I am a sect myself" (p. 373) — with doctrinal enforcement dropped and the church reduced to providing "a favorable environment" in which "each individual must work out his own ultimate solutions... without imposing on him a prefabricated set of answers" (p. 373). As for ''social implications,'' culture and personality themselves "have come to be viewed as endlessly revisable" (p. 373) — which can be read as the collapse of meaning, or, as Bellah argues "more fruitfully," as "unprecedented opportunities for creative innovation in every sphere of human action" (p. 374).

Michael at 13:58, 8 November 2026

2026-11-08T13:58:21Z

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Michael at 13:19, 8 November 2026

2026-11-08T13:19:51Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 13:19, 8 November 2026
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	On this basis he posited '''five ideal-typical stages''' — '''primitive,''' '''archaic,''' '''historic,''' '''early modern,''' and '''modern''' — each marked by a more differentiated symbolization:		On this basis he posited '''five ideal-typical stages''' — '''primitive,''' '''archaic,''' '''historic,''' '''early modern,''' and '''modern''' — each marked by a more differentiated symbolization:

	* '''~~primitive religion~~''' — a simplistic representation of "combinations...of experience which are contingent upon [a] particular social and physical environment."<ref>Leinhart quoted in Robert N. Bellah, “Religious Evolution,” pt. 358-274, ''Americal Sociological Review'' 29, no. 3 (1964). 361.</ref> Note that the symbolic representation of experience is an advance against animals and the "pre-religious" who could only "passively endure" suffering and not "transcend and dominate" it through symbolization. Remember here, for Bellah, "religious symbolization is concerned with imaging the ultimate conditions of existence."<ref>Robert N. Bellah, “Religious Evolution,” pt. 358-274, ''Americal Sociological Review'' 29, no. 3 (1964). 362.</ref> Here here see that reality is being represented but through myth (the symbol system), that this myth encourages ritual (religious action). ~~Religion~~ action is characterized not by ~~workshop~~ or sacrifice but by ''identification, participation, acting-out.''Here there is no "religious organization." "Church and society are one." As for ''social implications,'' all this helps tie the society together, in Durkheim's sense. Here '''mythical beings''' are projected as "great paradigmatic figures with whom men in ritual identify but with whom they do not really interact..." (p. 364). Myths here are fluid: <blockquote>Two main features of this mythical world of primitive religion are important...The first is the very high degree to which the mythical world is related to the detailed features of the actual world. Not only is every clan and local group defined in terms of the ancestral progenitors and the mythical elements of settlement, but virtually every mountain, and tree is explained in terms of the actions of mythical beings....The second main feature...is the fluidity of its organization....As Garang, which is the name of the first man, is sometimes associated with the first man and sometimes said to be quite different..." (p. 363)</blockquote>		* '''Primitive Religion''' — a simplistic representation of "combinations...of experience which are contingent upon [a] particular social and physical environment."<ref>Leinhart quoted in Robert N. Bellah, “Religious Evolution,” pt. 358-274, ''Americal Sociological Review'' 29, no. 3 (1964). 361.</ref>
	* '''~~archaic religion~~''' — a representation of reality as a single but now ''hierarchically ordered'' cosmos, inhabited by objectified beings "conceived as actively and sometimes willfully controlling the natural and human world... in a word they have become gods" (p. 364). The emergence of religion as "cult," with gods, priests, worship, sacrifice, and authority. Here the symbol system is still monistic ("there is still only one world") but more "definitely characterized." An elaboration of "a vast cosmology in which all things divine and natural have a place" (p. 364), stabilized by craft literacy. The '''religious action''' this stimulates is worship and above all sacrifice. Here we have the formation of the cult whereby priests communicate and try to influence the Gods through ritual and intent. This requires the development of "communication systems" through which gods and men can interact (p. 365), introducing "a greater element of intentionality" but also "an increased burden of anxiety" (p. 365). '''Socially,''' religion remains largely merged with other structures, but multiply with social differentiation. The multiplication of cults. The emergence of a 1a two-class system emerges in which noble families claim "superior religious status," and the divine king stands as "the chief link between his people and the gods" (p. 365); specialized priesthoods exist but serve "an essentially transient clientele" — still no congregation (p. 365). As for '''''social implications''','' these are similar to "primitive" religions. The individual and society are merged into a cosmic order. "Traditional social structures and social practices are considered to be grounded in the divinely instituted cosmic order..." (p. 365). "social conformity is at every point reinforced with religious sanction" (p. 365); yet gods acting "with a certain freedom" introduce "an element of openness" (p. 365), since the fortunes of rival groups can be read as shifts of divine favor — a rationalization of political change (Israel, Homeric Greece, Chou China) that ultimately "began to place the archaic pattern itself in jeopardy" (p. 366). Here Gods struggle in rival groups, mirroring the emergence of social class differentiation. Here, <blockquote>"mythical beings are more objectified, conceived as actively and sometimes willfully controlling the natural and human world, and as beings with whom men must deal in a definite and purpose way....Relations among the gods are a matter of considerable speculation and systematization, so that definite principles of organization, especially hierarchies of control, are established. The basic world view is still, like the primitives', monistic. There is still only one world with gods dominating....But though the world is one it is far more differentiated, especially in a hierarchical way, than was the monistic world view of the primitives: " (p. 364).</blockquote>		** The religious '''symbol system:''' Bellah seems a bit confused here. Notes it is "le monde mythique" and "the dreaming." Its two main features are
	* '''historic religion''' — ~~a representation of reality split~~ in ~~two~~, ~~proclaiming~~ "an entirely different realm of universal reality, ~~having for religious man the highest~~ value" (p. 366) ~~and devaluing this one~~. The symbol system is transcendental, dualistic, and "demythologized" relative to archaic cosmology, and for the first time universalistic: man is "no longer defined chiefly in terms of what tribe or clan he comes from or what particular god he serves but rather as a being capable of salvation" — "it is for the first time possible to conceive of man as such" (p. 366). The religious action this stimulates is "above all action necessary for salvation" (p. 366): historic religion "convicts man of a basic flaw" (greed and anger; sin; heedlessness of God) and the ideal becomes separation from the world. Socially, we get for the first time differentiated religious collectivities: "the single religio-political hierarchy of archaic society tends to split into two at least partially independent hierarchies, one political and one religious" (p. 367), the roles of believer and subject become distinct, and society settles into the four-class system of the great historic civilizations. As for ''social implications,'' a new level of tension enters history: political acts "could be judged in terms of standards that the political authorities could not finally control" (prophet vs. king, pope vs. emperor), and religion comes to provide "the ideology and social cohesion for many rebellions and reform movements" — a "more dynamic and especially a more purposive role in social change" (p. 368) — while continuing for long periods to legitimate the existing order.		*** "very high degree to which the mythical world is related to the detailed features of the actual world." (p. 362).
			*** fluidity of mythical narratives and concepts.
			*** Note that the symbolic representation of experience is an advance against animals and the "pre-religious" who could only "passively endure" suffering and not "transcend and dominate" it through symbolization. Remember here, for Bellah, "religious symbolization is concerned with imaging the ultimate conditions of existence."<ref>Robert N. Bellah, “Religious Evolution,” pt. 358-274, ''Americal Sociological Review'' 29, no. 3 (1964). 362.</ref> Here here see that reality is being represented but through myth (the symbol system), that this myth encourages ritual (religious action).
			** '''Religious action''' is characterized not by worhsip or sacrifice but by ''identification, participation, acting-out.'' Here there is no "religious organization." "Church and society are one." As for ''social implications,'' all this helps tie the society together, in Durkheim's sense. Here '''mythical beings''' are projected as "great paradigmatic figures with whom men in ritual identify but with whom they do not really interact..." (p. 364). Myths here are fluid
			*** <blockquote>Two main features of this mythical world of primitive religion are important...The first is the very high degree to which the mythical world is related to the detailed features of the actual world. Not only is every clan and local group defined in terms of the ancestral progenitors and the mythical elements of settlement, but virtually every mountain, and tree is explained in terms of the actions of mythical beings....The second main feature...is the fluidity of its organization....As Garang, which is the name of the first man, is sometimes associated with the first man and sometimes said to be quite different..." (p. 363)</blockquote>
			***'''Religious organization''' does not exist pe se. "Church and society are one. Religious roles tend to be fused with other roles..." (p. 363.)
			***Social implications are Durkheimian. Collective effervescence created pulls society together.
			* '''Archaic Religion''' — a representation of reality as a single but now ''hierarchically ordered'' cosmos, inhabited by objectified beings "conceived as actively and sometimes willfully controlling the natural and human world... in a word they have become gods" (p. 364). The emergence of religion as "cult," with gods, priests, worship, sacrifice, and authority. Here the symbol system is still monistic ("there is still only one world") but more "definitely characterized." An elaboration of "a vast cosmology in which all things divine and natural have a place" (p. 364), stabilized by craft literacy.
			** The '''religious action''' this stimulates is worship and above all sacrifice. Here we have the formation of the cult whereby priests communicate and try to influence the Gods through ritual and intent. This requires the development of "communication systems" through which gods and men can interact (p. 365), introducing "a greater element of intentionality" but also "an increased burden of anxiety" (p. 365).
			** '''Socially,''' religion remains largely merged with other structures, but multiply with social differentiation. The multiplication of cults. The emergence of a 1a two-class system emerges in which noble families claim "superior religious status," and the divine king stands as "the chief link between his people and the gods" (p. 365); specialized priesthoods exist but serve "an essentially transient clientele" — still no congregation (p. 365).
			** As for '''''social implications''','' these are similar to "primitive" religions. The individual and society are merged into a cosmic order. "Traditional social structures and social practices are considered to be grounded in the divinely instituted cosmic order..." (p. 365). "social conformity is at every point reinforced with religious sanction" (p. 365); yet gods acting "with a certain freedom" introduce "an element of openness" (p. 365), since the fortunes of rival groups can be read as shifts of divine favor — a rationalization of political change (Israel, Homeric Greece, Chou China) that ultimately "began to place the archaic pattern itself in jeopardy" (p. 366). Here Gods struggle in rival groups, mirroring the emergence of social class differentiation. Here, <blockquote>"mythical beings are more objectified, conceived as actively and sometimes willfully controlling the natural and human world, and as beings with whom men must deal in a definite and purpose way....Relations among the gods are a matter of considerable speculation and systematization, so that definite principles of organization, especially hierarchies of control, are established. The basic world view is still, like the primitives', monistic. There is still only one world with gods dominating....But though the world is one it is far more differentiated, especially in a hierarchical way, than was the monistic world view of the primitives: " (p. 364).</blockquote>
			* '''historic religion''' — historical because they recent, emerge in more or less literate societies, and fall under the discipline of history and not ethnography or archaeology. "The cosmological monism of the earlier stage is now more or less completely broken through and an entirely different realm of universal reality...is proclaimed." (p. 366). The key distinguishing criterion here is that these religions are "transcendental." There is the "normal" world and the transcendental world, which generally is given to have more value (p. 366).
			** '''The symbol system''' is transcendental, dualistic, and "demythologized" relative to archaic cosmology, and for the first time universalistic: man is "no longer defined chiefly in terms of what tribe or clan he comes from or what particular god he serves but rather as a being capable of salvation" — "it is for the first time possible to conceive of man as such" (p. 366).
			** '''The religious action''' this stimulates is "above all action necessary for salvation" (p. 366): historic religion "convicts man of a basic flaw" (greed and anger; sin; heedlessness of God) and the ideal becomes separation from the world. Socially, we get for the first time differentiated religious collectivities: "the single religio-political hierarchy of archaic society tends to split into two at least partially independent hierarchies, one political and one religious" (p. 367), the roles of believer and subject become distinct, and society settles into the four-class system of the great historic civilizations. As for ''social implications,'' a new level of tension enters history: political acts "could be judged in terms of standards that the political authorities could not finally control" (prophet vs. king, pope vs. emperor), and religion comes to provide "the ideology and social cohesion for many rebellions and reform movements" — a "more dynamic and especially a more purposive role in social change" (p. 368) — while continuing for long periods to legitimate the existing order.
	* '''early modern religion''' — a representation marked by "the collapse of the hierarchical structuring of both this and the other world" (p. 368). Dualism remains, but as direct confrontation: much of the cosmological baggage is dropped "as superstition," and the stress falls on faith, "an internal quality of the person," over acts marked "religious" (p. 369). The religious action this stimulates is world-affirming: "salvation is not to be found in any kind of withdrawal from the world but in the midst of worldly activities" (p. 368); indeed "religious action was now conceived to be identical with the whole of life" (p. 369), the service of God as "a total demand in every walk of life." Socially, the Reformation rejects both papal authority and the old two-level religious hierarchy, replacing it with a new two-class system of "elect and reprobates" — a vanguard group rather than a qualitative religious elite (p. 369) — while church and state lose their reified standing in favor of "a more flexible multi-centered mode of social organization based more on contract and voluntary association" (p. 370). As for ''social implications,'' "for the first time pressures to social change in the direction of greater realization of religious values are actually institutionalized as part of the structure of the society itself" (p. 370) — the self-revising, voluntaristic, democratic social order.		* '''early modern religion''' — a representation marked by "the collapse of the hierarchical structuring of both this and the other world" (p. 368). Dualism remains, but as direct confrontation: much of the cosmological baggage is dropped "as superstition," and the stress falls on faith, "an internal quality of the person," over acts marked "religious" (p. 369). The religious action this stimulates is world-affirming: "salvation is not to be found in any kind of withdrawal from the world but in the midst of worldly activities" (p. 368); indeed "religious action was now conceived to be identical with the whole of life" (p. 369), the service of God as "a total demand in every walk of life." Socially, the Reformation rejects both papal authority and the old two-level religious hierarchy, replacing it with a new two-class system of "elect and reprobates" — a vanguard group rather than a qualitative religious elite (p. 369) — while church and state lose their reified standing in favor of "a more flexible multi-centered mode of social organization based more on contract and voluntary association" (p. 370). As for ''social implications,'' "for the first time pressures to social change in the direction of greater realization of religious values are actually institutionalized as part of the structure of the society itself" (p. 370) — the self-revising, voluntaristic, democratic social order.
	* '''modern religion''' — a representation marked by "the collapse of the dualism that was so crucial to all the historic religions" (p. 371). After Kant, "it is not so much a question of two worlds as it is of as many worlds as there are modes of apprehending them"; "an infinitely multiplex one has replaced the simple duplex structure" (p. 371), and religion must be grounded "in the structure of the human situation itself" (p. 371). The religious action this stimulates is the search for meaning beyond any church: "the search for adequate standards of action, which is at the same time a search for personal maturity and social relevance, is in itself the heart of the modern quest for salvation" (p. 373). Socially, organization becomes radically fluid and voluntary — Thomas Paine's "My mind is my church," Jefferson's "I am a sect myself" (p. 373) — with doctrinal enforcement dropped and the church reduced to providing "a favorable environment" in which "each individual must work out his own ultimate solutions... without imposing on him a prefabricated set of answers" (p. 373). As for ''social implications,'' culture and personality themselves "have come to be viewed as endlessly revisable" (p. 373) — which can be read as the collapse of meaning, or, as Bellah argues "more fruitfully," as "unprecedented opportunities for creative innovation in every sphere of human action" (p. 374).		* '''modern religion''' — a representation marked by "the collapse of the dualism that was so crucial to all the historic religions" (p. 371). After Kant, "it is not so much a question of two worlds as it is of as many worlds as there are modes of apprehending them"; "an infinitely multiplex one has replaced the simple duplex structure" (p. 371), and religion must be grounded "in the structure of the human situation itself" (p. 371). The religious action this stimulates is the search for meaning beyond any church: "the search for adequate standards of action, which is at the same time a search for personal maturity and social relevance, is in itself the heart of the modern quest for salvation" (p. 373). Socially, organization becomes radically fluid and voluntary — Thomas Paine's "My mind is my church," Jefferson's "I am a sect myself" (p. 373) — with doctrinal enforcement dropped and the church reduced to providing "a favorable environment" in which "each individual must work out his own ultimate solutions... without imposing on him a prefabricated set of answers" (p. 373). As for ''social implications,'' culture and personality themselves "have come to be viewed as endlessly revisable" (p. 373) — which can be read as the collapse of meaning, or, as Bellah argues "more fruitfully," as "unprecedented opportunities for creative innovation in every sphere of human action" (p. 374).

Michael at 13:03, 8 November 2026

2026-11-08T13:03:52Z

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	'''Robert Neelly Bellah''' (1927–2013) was an American sociologist of religion, educated at Harvard (where he studied with Talcott Parsons) and long-serving as Elliott Professor of Sociology at the University of California, Berkeley (1967–1997). His major works include ''Tokugawa Religion'' (1957), the essays "Religious Evolution" (1964) and "Civil Religion in America" (1967), ''The Broken Covenant'' (1975), the co-authored bestseller ''Habits of the Heart'' (1985), and his final magnum opus, ''Religion in Human Evolution: From the Paleolithic to the Axial Age'' (2011). Bellah is arguably the most influential American sociologist of religion of his generation: he single-handedly rehabilitated evolutionary theorizing about religion after its mid-twentieth-century retreat, and his concept of "civil religion" remains a standard tool for analyzing the religious dimensions of national life. His continued relevance is visible in ongoing debates over the Axial Age, the cognitive science of religion, secularization, and the religious grounding of public life.		'''Robert Neelly Bellah''' (1927–2013) was an American sociologist of religion, educated at Harvard (where he studied with Talcott Parsons) and long-serving as Elliott Professor of Sociology at the University of California, Berkeley (1967–1997). His major works include ''Tokugawa Religion'' (1957), the essays "Religious Evolution" (1964) and "Civil Religion in America" (1967), ''The Broken Covenant'' (1975), the co-authored bestseller ''Habits of the Heart'' (1985), and his final magnum opus, ''Religion in Human Evolution: From the Paleolithic to the Axial Age'' (2011). Bellah is arguably the most influential American sociologist of religion of his generation: he single-handedly rehabilitated evolutionary theorizing about religion after its mid-twentieth-century retreat, and his concept of "civil religion" remains a standard tool for analyzing the religious dimensions of national life. His continued relevance is visible in ongoing debates over the Axial Age, the cognitive science of religion, secularization, and the religious grounding of public life.
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	On this basis he posited '''five ideal-typical stages''' — '''primitive,''' '''archaic,''' '''historic,''' '''early modern,''' and '''modern''' — each marked by a more differentiated symbolization:		On this basis he posited '''five ideal-typical stages''' — '''primitive,''' '''archaic,''' '''historic,''' '''early modern,''' and '''modern''' — each marked by a more differentiated symbolization:

	* '''primitive religion''' — a simplistic representation of "combinations...of experience which are contingent upon [a] particular social and physical environment."<ref>Leinhart quoted in Robert N. Bellah, “Religious Evolution,” pt. 358-274, ''Americal Sociological Review'' 29, no. 3 (1964). 361.</ref> Note that the symbolic representation of experience is an advance against animals and the "pre-religious" who could only "passively endure" suffering and not "transcend and dominate" it through symbolization. Remember here, for Bellah, "religious symbolization is concerned with imaging the ultimate conditions of existence."<ref>Robert N. Bellah, “Religious Evolution,” pt. 358-274, ''Americal Sociological Review'' 29, no. 3 (1964). 362.</ref> Here here see that reality is being represented but through myth (the symbol system), that this myth encourages ritual (religious action). Here there is no "religious organization." "Church and society are one." As for ''social implications,'' all this helps tie the society together, in Durkheim's sense.		* '''primitive religion''' — a simplistic representation of "combinations...of experience which are contingent upon [a] particular social and physical environment."<ref>Leinhart quoted in Robert N. Bellah, “Religious Evolution,” pt. 358-274, ''Americal Sociological Review'' 29, no. 3 (1964). 361.</ref> Note that the symbolic representation of experience is an advance against animals and the "pre-religious" who could only "passively endure" suffering and not "transcend and dominate" it through symbolization. Remember here, for Bellah, "religious symbolization is concerned with imaging the ultimate conditions of existence."<ref>Robert N. Bellah, “Religious Evolution,” pt. 358-274, ''Americal Sociological Review'' 29, no. 3 (1964). 362.</ref> Here here see that reality is being represented but through myth (the symbol system), that this myth encourages ritual (religious action). Religion action is characterized not by workshop or sacrifice but by ''identification, participation, acting-out.''Here there is no "religious organization." "Church and society are one." As for ''social implications,'' all this helps tie the society together, in Durkheim's sense. Here '''mythical beings''' are projected as "great paradigmatic figures with whom men in ritual identify but with whom they do not really interact..." (p. 364). Myths here are fluid: <blockquote>Two main features of this mythical world of primitive religion are important...The first is the very high degree to which the mythical world is related to the detailed features of the actual world. Not only is every clan and local group defined in terms of the ancestral progenitors and the mythical elements of settlement, but virtually every mountain, and tree is explained in terms of the actions of mythical beings....The second main feature...is the fluidity of its organization....As Garang, which is the name of the first man, is sometimes associated with the first man and sometimes said to be quite different..." (p. 363)</blockquote>
	* '''archaic religion''' — a representation of reality as a single but now ''hierarchically ordered'' cosmos, inhabited by objectified beings "conceived as actively and sometimes willfully controlling the natural and human world... in a word they have become gods" (p. 364). The emergence of religion as "cult," with gods, priests, worship, sacrifice, and authority. Here the symbol system is still monistic ("there is still only one world") but more "definitely characterized." An elaboration of "a vast cosmology in which all things divine and natural have a place" (p. 364), stabilized by craft literacy. The '''religious action''' this stimulates is worship and above all sacrifice — "communication systems" through which gods and men can interact (p. 365), introducing "a greater element of intentionality" but also "an increased burden of anxiety" (p. 365). '''Socially,''' religion remains largely merged with other structures, but ~~cults~~ multiply with social differentiation, a two-class system emerges in which noble families claim "superior religious status," and the divine king stands as "the chief link between his people and the gods" (p. 365); specialized priesthoods exist but serve "an essentially transient clientele" — still no congregation (p. 365). As for '''''social implications''','' "social conformity is at every point reinforced with religious sanction" (p. 365); yet gods acting "with a certain freedom" introduce "an element of openness" (p. 365), since the fortunes of rival groups can be read as shifts of divine favor — a rationalization of political change (Israel, Homeric Greece, Chou China) that ultimately "began to place the archaic pattern itself in jeopardy" (p. 366).		* '''archaic religion''' — a representation of reality as a single but now ''hierarchically ordered'' cosmos, inhabited by objectified beings "conceived as actively and sometimes willfully controlling the natural and human world... in a word they have become gods" (p. 364). The emergence of religion as "cult," with gods, priests, worship, sacrifice, and authority. Here the symbol system is still monistic ("there is still only one world") but more "definitely characterized." An elaboration of "a vast cosmology in which all things divine and natural have a place" (p. 364), stabilized by craft literacy. The '''religious action''' this stimulates is worship and above all sacrifice. Here we have the formation of the cult whereby priests communicate and try to influence the Gods through ritual and intent. This requires the development of "communication systems" through which gods and men can interact (p. 365), introducing "a greater element of intentionality" but also "an increased burden of anxiety" (p. 365). '''Socially,''' religion remains largely merged with other structures, but multiply with social differentiation. The multiplication of cults. The emergence of a 1a two-class system emerges in which noble families claim "superior religious status," and the divine king stands as "the chief link between his people and the gods" (p. 365); specialized priesthoods exist but serve "an essentially transient clientele" — still no congregation (p. 365). As for '''''social implications''','' these are similar to "primitive" religions. The individual and society are merged into a cosmic order. "Traditional social structures and social practices are considered to be grounded in the divinely instituted cosmic order..." (p. 365). "social conformity is at every point reinforced with religious sanction" (p. 365); yet gods acting "with a certain freedom" introduce "an element of openness" (p. 365), since the fortunes of rival groups can be read as shifts of divine favor — a rationalization of political change (Israel, Homeric Greece, Chou China) that ultimately "began to place the archaic pattern itself in jeopardy" (p. 366). Here Gods struggle in rival groups, mirroring the emergence of social class differentiation. Here, <blockquote>"mythical beings are more objectified, conceived as actively and sometimes willfully controlling the natural and human world, and as beings with whom men must deal in a definite and purpose way....Relations among the gods are a matter of considerable speculation and systematization, so that definite principles of organization, especially hierarchies of control, are established. The basic world view is still, like the primitives', monistic. There is still only one world with gods dominating....But though the world is one it is far more differentiated, especially in a hierarchical way, than was the monistic world view of the primitives: " (p. 364).</blockquote>
	* '''historic religion''' — a representation of reality split in two, proclaiming "an entirely different realm of universal reality, having for religious man the highest value" (p. 366) and devaluing this one. The symbol system is transcendental, dualistic, and "demythologized" relative to archaic cosmology, and for the first time universalistic: man is "no longer defined chiefly in terms of what tribe or clan he comes from or what particular god he serves but rather as a being capable of salvation" — "it is for the first time possible to conceive of man as such" (p. 366). The religious action this stimulates is "above all action necessary for salvation" (p. 366): historic religion "convicts man of a basic flaw" (greed and anger; sin; heedlessness of God) and the ideal becomes separation from the world. Socially, we get for the first time differentiated religious collectivities: "the single religio-political hierarchy of archaic society tends to split into two at least partially independent hierarchies, one political and one religious" (p. 367), the roles of believer and subject become distinct, and society settles into the four-class system of the great historic civilizations. As for ''social implications,'' a new level of tension enters history: political acts "could be judged in terms of standards that the political authorities could not finally control" (prophet vs. king, pope vs. emperor), and religion comes to provide "the ideology and social cohesion for many rebellions and reform movements" — a "more dynamic and especially a more purposive role in social change" (p. 368) — while continuing for long periods to legitimate the existing order.		* '''historic religion''' — a representation of reality split in two, proclaiming "an entirely different realm of universal reality, having for religious man the highest value" (p. 366) and devaluing this one. The symbol system is transcendental, dualistic, and "demythologized" relative to archaic cosmology, and for the first time universalistic: man is "no longer defined chiefly in terms of what tribe or clan he comes from or what particular god he serves but rather as a being capable of salvation" — "it is for the first time possible to conceive of man as such" (p. 366). The religious action this stimulates is "above all action necessary for salvation" (p. 366): historic religion "convicts man of a basic flaw" (greed and anger; sin; heedlessness of God) and the ideal becomes separation from the world. Socially, we get for the first time differentiated religious collectivities: "the single religio-political hierarchy of archaic society tends to split into two at least partially independent hierarchies, one political and one religious" (p. 367), the roles of believer and subject become distinct, and society settles into the four-class system of the great historic civilizations. As for ''social implications,'' a new level of tension enters history: political acts "could be judged in terms of standards that the political authorities could not finally control" (prophet vs. king, pope vs. emperor), and religion comes to provide "the ideology and social cohesion for many rebellions and reform movements" — a "more dynamic and especially a more purposive role in social change" (p. 368) — while continuing for long periods to legitimate the existing order.
	* '''early modern religion''' — a representation marked by "the collapse of the hierarchical structuring of both this and the other world" (p. 368). Dualism remains, but as direct confrontation: much of the cosmological baggage is dropped "as superstition," and the stress falls on faith, "an internal quality of the person," over acts marked "religious" (p. 369). The religious action this stimulates is world-affirming: "salvation is not to be found in any kind of withdrawal from the world but in the midst of worldly activities" (p. 368); indeed "religious action was now conceived to be identical with the whole of life" (p. 369), the service of God as "a total demand in every walk of life." Socially, the Reformation rejects both papal authority and the old two-level religious hierarchy, replacing it with a new two-class system of "elect and reprobates" — a vanguard group rather than a qualitative religious elite (p. 369) — while church and state lose their reified standing in favor of "a more flexible multi-centered mode of social organization based more on contract and voluntary association" (p. 370). As for ''social implications,'' "for the first time pressures to social change in the direction of greater realization of religious values are actually institutionalized as part of the structure of the society itself" (p. 370) — the self-revising, voluntaristic, democratic social order.		* '''early modern religion''' — a representation marked by "the collapse of the hierarchical structuring of both this and the other world" (p. 368). Dualism remains, but as direct confrontation: much of the cosmological baggage is dropped "as superstition," and the stress falls on faith, "an internal quality of the person," over acts marked "religious" (p. 369). The religious action this stimulates is world-affirming: "salvation is not to be found in any kind of withdrawal from the world but in the midst of worldly activities" (p. 368); indeed "religious action was now conceived to be identical with the whole of life" (p. 369), the service of God as "a total demand in every walk of life." Socially, the Reformation rejects both papal authority and the old two-level religious hierarchy, replacing it with a new two-class system of "elect and reprobates" — a vanguard group rather than a qualitative religious elite (p. 369) — while church and state lose their reified standing in favor of "a more flexible multi-centered mode of social organization based more on contract and voluntary association" (p. 370). As for ''social implications,'' "for the first time pressures to social change in the direction of greater realization of religious values are actually institutionalized as part of the structure of the society itself" (p. 370) — the self-revising, voluntaristic, democratic social order.

Michael at 16:06, 7 November 2026

2026-11-07T16:06:17Z

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	'''Robert Neelly Bellah''' (1927–2013) was an American sociologist of religion, educated at Harvard (where he studied with Talcott Parsons) and long-serving as Elliott Professor of Sociology at the University of California, Berkeley (1967–1997). His major works include ''Tokugawa Religion'' (1957), the essays "Religious Evolution" (1964) and "Civil Religion in America" (1967), ''The Broken Covenant'' (1975), the co-authored bestseller ''Habits of the Heart'' (1985), and his final magnum opus, ''Religion in Human Evolution: From the Paleolithic to the Axial Age'' (2011). Bellah is arguably the most influential American sociologist of religion of his generation: he single-handedly rehabilitated evolutionary theorizing about religion after its mid-twentieth-century retreat, and his concept of "civil religion" remains a standard tool for analyzing the religious dimensions of national life. His continued relevance is visible in ongoing debates over the Axial Age, the cognitive science of religion, secularization, and the religious grounding of public life.		'''Robert Neelly Bellah''' (1927–2013) was an American sociologist of religion, educated at Harvard (where he studied with Talcott Parsons) and long-serving as Elliott Professor of Sociology at the University of California, Berkeley (1967–1997). His major works include ''Tokugawa Religion'' (1957), the essays "Religious Evolution" (1964) and "Civil Religion in America" (1967), ''The Broken Covenant'' (1975), the co-authored bestseller ''Habits of the Heart'' (1985), and his final magnum opus, ''Religion in Human Evolution: From the Paleolithic to the Axial Age'' (2011). Bellah is arguably the most influential American sociologist of religion of his generation: he single-handedly rehabilitated evolutionary theorizing about religion after its mid-twentieth-century retreat, and his concept of "civil religion" remains a standard tool for analyzing the religious dimensions of national life. His continued relevance is visible in ongoing debates over the Axial Age, the cognitive science of religion, secularization, and the religious grounding of public life.
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	* '''primitive religion''' — a simplistic representation of "combinations...of experience which are contingent upon [a] particular social and physical environment."<ref>Leinhart quoted in Robert N. Bellah, “Religious Evolution,” pt. 358-274, ''Americal Sociological Review'' 29, no. 3 (1964). 361.</ref> Note that the symbolic representation of experience is an advance against animals and the "pre-religious" who could only "passively endure" suffering and not "transcend and dominate" it through symbolization. Remember here, for Bellah, "religious symbolization is concerned with imaging the ultimate conditions of existence."<ref>Robert N. Bellah, “Religious Evolution,” pt. 358-274, ''Americal Sociological Review'' 29, no. 3 (1964). 362.</ref> Here here see that reality is being represented but through myth (the symbol system), that this myth encourages ritual (religious action). Here there is no "religious organization." "Church and society are one." As for ''social implications,'' all this helps tie the society together, in Durkheim's sense.		* '''primitive religion''' — a simplistic representation of "combinations...of experience which are contingent upon [a] particular social and physical environment."<ref>Leinhart quoted in Robert N. Bellah, “Religious Evolution,” pt. 358-274, ''Americal Sociological Review'' 29, no. 3 (1964). 361.</ref> Note that the symbolic representation of experience is an advance against animals and the "pre-religious" who could only "passively endure" suffering and not "transcend and dominate" it through symbolization. Remember here, for Bellah, "religious symbolization is concerned with imaging the ultimate conditions of existence."<ref>Robert N. Bellah, “Religious Evolution,” pt. 358-274, ''Americal Sociological Review'' 29, no. 3 (1964). 362.</ref> Here here see that reality is being represented but through myth (the symbol system), that this myth encourages ritual (religious action). Here there is no "religious organization." "Church and society are one." As for ''social implications,'' all this helps tie the society together, in Durkheim's sense.
	* '''archaic religion''' — a representation of reality as a single but now ''hierarchically ordered'' cosmos, inhabited by objectified beings "conceived as actively and sometimes willfully controlling the natural and human world... in a word they have become gods" (p. 364). Here the symbol system is still monistic ("there is still only one world") but ~~elaborates~~ "a vast cosmology in which all things divine and natural have a place" (p. 364), stabilized by craft literacy. The religious action this stimulates is worship and above all sacrifice — "communication systems" through which gods and men can interact (p. 365), introducing "a greater element of intentionality" but also "an increased burden of anxiety" (p. 365). Socially, religion remains largely merged with other structures, but cults multiply with social differentiation, a two-class system emerges in which noble families claim "superior religious status," and the divine king stands as "the chief link between his people and the gods" (p. 365); specialized priesthoods exist but serve "an essentially transient clientele" — still no congregation (p. 365). As for ''social implications,'' "social conformity is at every point reinforced with religious sanction" (p. 365); yet gods acting "with a certain freedom" introduce "an element of openness" (p. 365), since the fortunes of rival groups can be read as shifts of divine favor — a rationalization of political change (Israel, Homeric Greece, Chou China) that ultimately "began to place the archaic pattern itself in jeopardy" (p. 366).		* '''archaic religion''' — a representation of reality as a single but now ''hierarchically ordered'' cosmos, inhabited by objectified beings "conceived as actively and sometimes willfully controlling the natural and human world... in a word they have become gods" (p. 364). The emergence of religion as "cult," with gods, priests, worship, sacrifice, and authority. Here the symbol system is still monistic ("there is still only one world") but more "definitely characterized." An elaboration of "a vast cosmology in which all things divine and natural have a place" (p. 364), stabilized by craft literacy. The '''religious action''' this stimulates is worship and above all sacrifice — "communication systems" through which gods and men can interact (p. 365), introducing "a greater element of intentionality" but also "an increased burden of anxiety" (p. 365). '''Socially,''' religion remains largely merged with other structures, but cults multiply with social differentiation, a two-class system emerges in which noble families claim "superior religious status," and the divine king stands as "the chief link between his people and the gods" (p. 365); specialized priesthoods exist but serve "an essentially transient clientele" — still no congregation (p. 365). As for '''''social implications''','' "social conformity is at every point reinforced with religious sanction" (p. 365); yet gods acting "with a certain freedom" introduce "an element of openness" (p. 365), since the fortunes of rival groups can be read as shifts of divine favor — a rationalization of political change (Israel, Homeric Greece, Chou China) that ultimately "began to place the archaic pattern itself in jeopardy" (p. 366).
	* '''historic religion''' — a representation of reality split in two, proclaiming "an entirely different realm of universal reality, having for religious man the highest value" (p. 366) and devaluing this one. The symbol system is transcendental, dualistic, and "demythologized" relative to archaic cosmology, and for the first time universalistic: man is "no longer defined chiefly in terms of what tribe or clan he comes from or what particular god he serves but rather as a being capable of salvation" — "it is for the first time possible to conceive of man as such" (p. 366). The religious action this stimulates is "above all action necessary for salvation" (p. 366): historic religion "convicts man of a basic flaw" (greed and anger; sin; heedlessness of God) and the ideal becomes separation from the world. Socially, we get for the first time differentiated religious collectivities: "the single religio-political hierarchy of archaic society tends to split into two at least partially independent hierarchies, one political and one religious" (p. 367), the roles of believer and subject become distinct, and society settles into the four-class system of the great historic civilizations. As for ''social implications,'' a new level of tension enters history: political acts "could be judged in terms of standards that the political authorities could not finally control" (prophet vs. king, pope vs. emperor), and religion comes to provide "the ideology and social cohesion for many rebellions and reform movements" — a "more dynamic and especially a more purposive role in social change" (p. 368) — while continuing for long periods to legitimate the existing order.		* '''historic religion''' — a representation of reality split in two, proclaiming "an entirely different realm of universal reality, having for religious man the highest value" (p. 366) and devaluing this one. The symbol system is transcendental, dualistic, and "demythologized" relative to archaic cosmology, and for the first time universalistic: man is "no longer defined chiefly in terms of what tribe or clan he comes from or what particular god he serves but rather as a being capable of salvation" — "it is for the first time possible to conceive of man as such" (p. 366). The religious action this stimulates is "above all action necessary for salvation" (p. 366): historic religion "convicts man of a basic flaw" (greed and anger; sin; heedlessness of God) and the ideal becomes separation from the world. Socially, we get for the first time differentiated religious collectivities: "the single religio-political hierarchy of archaic society tends to split into two at least partially independent hierarchies, one political and one religious" (p. 367), the roles of believer and subject become distinct, and society settles into the four-class system of the great historic civilizations. As for ''social implications,'' a new level of tension enters history: political acts "could be judged in terms of standards that the political authorities could not finally control" (prophet vs. king, pope vs. emperor), and religion comes to provide "the ideology and social cohesion for many rebellions and reform movements" — a "more dynamic and especially a more purposive role in social change" (p. 368) — while continuing for long periods to legitimate the existing order.
	* '''early modern religion''' — a representation marked by "the collapse of the hierarchical structuring of both this and the other world" (p. 368). Dualism remains, but as direct confrontation: much of the cosmological baggage is dropped "as superstition," and the stress falls on faith, "an internal quality of the person," over acts marked "religious" (p. 369). The religious action this stimulates is world-affirming: "salvation is not to be found in any kind of withdrawal from the world but in the midst of worldly activities" (p. 368); indeed "religious action was now conceived to be identical with the whole of life" (p. 369), the service of God as "a total demand in every walk of life." Socially, the Reformation rejects both papal authority and the old two-level religious hierarchy, replacing it with a new two-class system of "elect and reprobates" — a vanguard group rather than a qualitative religious elite (p. 369) — while church and state lose their reified standing in favor of "a more flexible multi-centered mode of social organization based more on contract and voluntary association" (p. 370). As for ''social implications,'' "for the first time pressures to social change in the direction of greater realization of religious values are actually institutionalized as part of the structure of the society itself" (p. 370) — the self-revising, voluntaristic, democratic social order.		* '''early modern religion''' — a representation marked by "the collapse of the hierarchical structuring of both this and the other world" (p. 368). Dualism remains, but as direct confrontation: much of the cosmological baggage is dropped "as superstition," and the stress falls on faith, "an internal quality of the person," over acts marked "religious" (p. 369). The religious action this stimulates is world-affirming: "salvation is not to be found in any kind of withdrawal from the world but in the midst of worldly activities" (p. 368); indeed "religious action was now conceived to be identical with the whole of life" (p. 369), the service of God as "a total demand in every walk of life." Socially, the Reformation rejects both papal authority and the old two-level religious hierarchy, replacing it with a new two-class system of "elect and reprobates" — a vanguard group rather than a qualitative religious elite (p. 369) — while church and state lose their reified standing in favor of "a more flexible multi-centered mode of social organization based more on contract and voluntary association" (p. 370). As for ''social implications,'' "for the first time pressures to social change in the direction of greater realization of religious values are actually institutionalized as part of the structure of the society itself" (p. 370) — the self-revising, voluntaristic, democratic social order.

Michael at 15:59, 7 November 2026

2026-11-07T15:59:15Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 15:59, 7 November 2026
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	On this basis he posited '''five ideal-typical stages''' — '''primitive,''' '''archaic,''' '''historic,''' '''early modern,''' and '''modern''' — each marked by a more differentiated symbolization:		On this basis he posited '''five ideal-typical stages''' — '''primitive,''' '''archaic,''' '''historic,''' '''early modern,''' and '''modern''' — each marked by a more differentiated symbolization:

	* '''primitive religion''', a simplistic representation of "combinations...of experience which are contingent upon [a] particular social and physical environment."<ref>Leinhart quoted in Robert N. Bellah, “Religious Evolution,” pt. 358-274, ''Americal Sociological Review'' 29, no. 3 (1964). 361.</ref> Note that the symbolic representation of experience is an advance against animals and the "pre-religious" who could only "passively endure" suffering and not "transcend and dominate" it through symbolization. Remember here, for Bellah, "religious symbolization is concerned with imaging the ultimate conditions of existence."<ref>Robert N. Bellah, “Religious Evolution,” pt. 358-274, ''Americal Sociological Review'' 29, no. 3 (1964). 362.</ref> Here here see that reality is being represented but through myth (the symbol system), that this myth encourages ritual (religious action). Here there is no "religious organization." "Church and society are one." As for ''social implications,'' all this helps tie the society together, in Durkheim's sense.		* '''primitive religion''' — a simplistic representation of "combinations...of experience which are contingent upon [a] particular social and physical environment."<ref>Leinhart quoted in Robert N. Bellah, “Religious Evolution,” pt. 358-274, ''Americal Sociological Review'' 29, no. 3 (1964). 361.</ref> Note that the symbolic representation of experience is an advance against animals and the "pre-religious" who could only "passively endure" suffering and not "transcend and dominate" it through symbolization. Remember here, for Bellah, "religious symbolization is concerned with imaging the ultimate conditions of existence."<ref>Robert N. Bellah, “Religious Evolution,” pt. 358-274, ''Americal Sociological Review'' 29, no. 3 (1964). 362.</ref> Here here see that reality is being represented but through myth (the symbol system), that this myth encourages ritual (religious action). Here there is no "religious organization." "Church and society are one." As for ''social implications,'' all this helps tie the society together, in Durkheim's sense.
	* '''archaic religion''' — a representation of reality as a single but now hierarchically ordered cosmos, inhabited by objectified beings "conceived as actively and sometimes willfully controlling the natural and human world... in a word they have become gods" (p. 364). Here the symbol system is still monistic ("there is still only one world") but elaborates "a vast cosmology in which all things divine and natural have a place" (p. 364), stabilized by craft literacy. The religious action this stimulates is worship and above all sacrifice — "communication systems" through which gods and men can interact (p. 365), introducing "a greater element of intentionality" but also "an increased burden of anxiety" (p. 365). Socially, religion remains largely merged with other structures, but cults multiply with social differentiation, a two-class system emerges in which noble families claim "superior religious status," and the divine king stands as "the chief link between his people and the gods" (p. 365); specialized priesthoods exist but serve "an essentially transient clientele" — still no congregation (p. 365). As for ''social implications,'' "social conformity is at every point reinforced with religious sanction" (p. 365); yet gods acting "with a certain freedom" introduce "an element of openness" (p. 365), since the fortunes of rival groups can be read as shifts of divine favor — a rationalization of political change (Israel, Homeric Greece, Chou China) that ultimately "began to place the archaic pattern itself in jeopardy" (p. 366).		* '''archaic religion''' — a representation of reality as a single but now ''hierarchically ordered'' cosmos, inhabited by objectified beings "conceived as actively and sometimes willfully controlling the natural and human world... in a word they have become gods" (p. 364). Here the symbol system is still monistic ("there is still only one world") but elaborates "a vast cosmology in which all things divine and natural have a place" (p. 364), stabilized by craft literacy. The religious action this stimulates is worship and above all sacrifice — "communication systems" through which gods and men can interact (p. 365), introducing "a greater element of intentionality" but also "an increased burden of anxiety" (p. 365). Socially, religion remains largely merged with other structures, but cults multiply with social differentiation, a two-class system emerges in which noble families claim "superior religious status," and the divine king stands as "the chief link between his people and the gods" (p. 365); specialized priesthoods exist but serve "an essentially transient clientele" — still no congregation (p. 365). As for ''social implications,'' "social conformity is at every point reinforced with religious sanction" (p. 365); yet gods acting "with a certain freedom" introduce "an element of openness" (p. 365), since the fortunes of rival groups can be read as shifts of divine favor — a rationalization of political change (Israel, Homeric Greece, Chou China) that ultimately "began to place the archaic pattern itself in jeopardy" (p. 366).
	* '''historic religion''' — a representation of reality split in two, proclaiming "an entirely different realm of universal reality, having for religious man the highest value" (p. 366) and devaluing this one. The symbol system is transcendental, dualistic, and "demythologized" relative to archaic cosmology, and for the first time universalistic: man is "no longer defined chiefly in terms of what tribe or clan he comes from or what particular god he serves but rather as a being capable of salvation" — "it is for the first time possible to conceive of man as such" (p. 366). The religious action this stimulates is "above all action necessary for salvation" (p. 366): historic religion "convicts man of a basic flaw" (greed and anger; sin; heedlessness of God) and the ideal becomes separation from the world. Socially, we get for the first time differentiated religious collectivities: "the single religio-political hierarchy of archaic society tends to split into two at least partially independent hierarchies, one political and one religious" (p. 367), the roles of believer and subject become distinct, and society settles into the four-class system of the great historic civilizations. As for ''social implications,'' a new level of tension enters history: political acts "could be judged in terms of standards that the political authorities could not finally control" (prophet vs. king, pope vs. emperor), and religion comes to provide "the ideology and social cohesion for many rebellions and reform movements" — a "more dynamic and especially a more purposive role in social change" (p. 368) — while continuing for long periods to legitimate the existing order.		* '''historic religion''' — a representation of reality split in two, proclaiming "an entirely different realm of universal reality, having for religious man the highest value" (p. 366) and devaluing this one. The symbol system is transcendental, dualistic, and "demythologized" relative to archaic cosmology, and for the first time universalistic: man is "no longer defined chiefly in terms of what tribe or clan he comes from or what particular god he serves but rather as a being capable of salvation" — "it is for the first time possible to conceive of man as such" (p. 366). The religious action this stimulates is "above all action necessary for salvation" (p. 366): historic religion "convicts man of a basic flaw" (greed and anger; sin; heedlessness of God) and the ideal becomes separation from the world. Socially, we get for the first time differentiated religious collectivities: "the single religio-political hierarchy of archaic society tends to split into two at least partially independent hierarchies, one political and one religious" (p. 367), the roles of believer and subject become distinct, and society settles into the four-class system of the great historic civilizations. As for ''social implications,'' a new level of tension enters history: political acts "could be judged in terms of standards that the political authorities could not finally control" (prophet vs. king, pope vs. emperor), and religion comes to provide "the ideology and social cohesion for many rebellions and reform movements" — a "more dynamic and especially a more purposive role in social change" (p. 368) — while continuing for long periods to legitimate the existing order.
	* '''early modern religion''' — a representation marked by "the collapse of the hierarchical structuring of both this and the other world" (p. 368). Dualism remains, but as direct confrontation: much of the cosmological baggage is dropped "as superstition," and the stress falls on faith, "an internal quality of the person," over acts marked "religious" (p. 369). The religious action this stimulates is world-affirming: "salvation is not to be found in any kind of withdrawal from the world but in the midst of worldly activities" (p. 368); indeed "religious action was now conceived to be identical with the whole of life" (p. 369), the service of God as "a total demand in every walk of life." Socially, the Reformation rejects both papal authority and the old two-level religious hierarchy, replacing it with a new two-class system of "elect and reprobates" — a vanguard group rather than a qualitative religious elite (p. 369) — while church and state lose their reified standing in favor of "a more flexible multi-centered mode of social organization based more on contract and voluntary association" (p. 370). As for ''social implications,'' "for the first time pressures to social change in the direction of greater realization of religious values are actually institutionalized as part of the structure of the society itself" (p. 370) — the self-revising, voluntaristic, democratic social order.		* '''early modern religion''' — a representation marked by "the collapse of the hierarchical structuring of both this and the other world" (p. 368). Dualism remains, but as direct confrontation: much of the cosmological baggage is dropped "as superstition," and the stress falls on faith, "an internal quality of the person," over acts marked "religious" (p. 369). The religious action this stimulates is world-affirming: "salvation is not to be found in any kind of withdrawal from the world but in the midst of worldly activities" (p. 368); indeed "religious action was now conceived to be identical with the whole of life" (p. 369), the service of God as "a total demand in every walk of life." Socially, the Reformation rejects both papal authority and the old two-level religious hierarchy, replacing it with a new two-class system of "elect and reprobates" — a vanguard group rather than a qualitative religious elite (p. 369) — while church and state lose their reified standing in favor of "a more flexible multi-centered mode of social organization based more on contract and voluntary association" (p. 370). As for ''social implications,'' "for the first time pressures to social change in the direction of greater realization of religious values are actually institutionalized as part of the structure of the society itself" (p. 370) — the self-revising, voluntaristic, democratic social order.
	* '''modern religion''' — a representation marked by "the collapse of the dualism that was so crucial to all the historic religions" (p. 371). After Kant, "it is not so much a question of two worlds as it is of as many worlds as there are modes of apprehending them"; "an infinitely multiplex one has replaced the simple duplex structure" (p. 371), and religion must be grounded "in the structure of the human situation itself" (p. 371). The religious action this stimulates is the search for meaning beyond any church: "the search for adequate standards of action, which is at the same time a search for personal maturity and social relevance, is in itself the heart of the modern quest for salvation" (p. 373). Socially, organization becomes radically fluid and voluntary — Thomas Paine's "My mind is my church," Jefferson's "I am a sect myself" (p. 373) — with doctrinal enforcement dropped and the church reduced to providing "a favorable environment" in which "each individual must work out his own ultimate solutions... without imposing on him a prefabricated set of answers" (p. 373). As for ''social implications,'' culture and personality themselves "have come to be viewed as endlessly revisable" (p. 373) — which can be read as the collapse of meaning, or, as Bellah argues "more fruitfully," as "unprecedented opportunities for creative innovation in every sphere of human action" (p. 374).		* '''modern religion''' — a representation marked by "the collapse of the dualism that was so crucial to all the historic religions" (p. 371). After Kant, "it is not so much a question of two worlds as it is of as many worlds as there are modes of apprehending them"; "an infinitely multiplex one has replaced the simple duplex structure" (p. 371), and religion must be grounded "in the structure of the human situation itself" (p. 371). The religious action this stimulates is the search for meaning beyond any church: "the search for adequate standards of action, which is at the same time a search for personal maturity and social relevance, is in itself the heart of the modern quest for salvation" (p. 373). Socially, organization becomes radically fluid and voluntary — Thomas Paine's "My mind is my church," Jefferson's "I am a sect myself" (p. 373) — with doctrinal enforcement dropped and the church reduced to providing "a favorable environment" in which "each individual must work out his own ultimate solutions... without imposing on him a prefabricated set of answers" (p. 373). As for ''social implications,'' culture and personality themselves "have come to be viewed as endlessly revisable" (p. 373) — which can be read as the collapse of meaning, or, as Bellah argues "more fruitfully," as "unprecedented opportunities for creative innovation in every sphere of human action" (p. 374).


	Bellah insisted the stages were not inevitable, not a ranking of truth or value, and never wholly superseded — but the scheme's directional logic (compact to differentiated) and its culmination in liberal Protestant-inflected modernity drew sustained criticism for covert teleology and Eurocentrism.		Bellah insisted the stages were not inevitable, not a ranking of truth or value, and never wholly superseded — but the scheme's directional logic (compact to differentiated) and its culmination in liberal Protestant-inflected modernity drew sustained criticism for covert teleology and Eurocentrism.

Michael at 15:38, 7 November 2026

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	* the kind of religious action it stimulates,		* the kind of religious action it stimulates,
	* the kind of social organization in which this religious action occurs and"		* the kind of social organization in which this religious action occurs and"
	* the implications (social or otherwise) for social action and society in general..."<ref>Robert N. Bellah, “Religious Evolution,” pt. 358-~~274~~, ''~~Americal~~ Sociological Review'' 29, no. 3 (1964). ~~361~~.</ref>		* the implications (social or otherwise) for social action and society in general..."<ref>Robert N. Bellah, “Religious Evolution,” pt. 358-74, ''American Sociological Review'' 29, no. 3 (1964). 362.</ref>

	On this basis he posited '''five ideal-typical stages''' — '''primitive,''' '''archaic,''' '''historic,''' '''early modern,''' and '''modern''' — each marked by a more differentiated symbolization:		On this basis he posited '''five ideal-typical stages''' — '''primitive,''' '''archaic,''' '''historic,''' '''early modern,''' and '''modern''' — each marked by a more differentiated symbolization:

	* '''primitive religion''', a simplistic representation of "combinations...of experience which are contingent upon [a] particular social and physical environment."<ref>Leinhart quoted in Robert N. Bellah, “Religious Evolution,” pt. 358-274, ''Americal Sociological Review'' 29, no. 3 (1964). 361.</ref> Note that the symbolic representation of experience is an advance against animals and the "pre-religious" who could only "passively endure" suffering and not "transcend and dominate" it through symbolization. Remember here, for Bellah, "religious symbolization is concerned with imaging the ultimate conditions of existence."<ref>Robert N. Bellah, “Religious Evolution,” pt. 358-274, ''Americal Sociological Review'' 29, no. 3 (1964). 362.</ref> Here here see that reality is being represented but through myth (the symbol system), that this myth encourages ritual (religious action). Here there is no "religious organization." "Church and society are one." As for ''social implications,'' all this helps tie the society together, in Durkheim's sense.		* '''primitive religion''', a simplistic representation of "combinations...of experience which are contingent upon [a] particular social and physical environment."<ref>Leinhart quoted in Robert N. Bellah, “Religious Evolution,” pt. 358-274, ''Americal Sociological Review'' 29, no. 3 (1964). 361.</ref> Note that the symbolic representation of experience is an advance against animals and the "pre-religious" who could only "passively endure" suffering and not "transcend and dominate" it through symbolization. Remember here, for Bellah, "religious symbolization is concerned with imaging the ultimate conditions of existence."<ref>Robert N. Bellah, “Religious Evolution,” pt. 358-274, ''Americal Sociological Review'' 29, no. 3 (1964). 362.</ref> Here here see that reality is being represented but through myth (the symbol system), that this myth encourages ritual (religious action). Here there is no "religious organization." "Church and society are one." As for ''social implications,'' all this helps tie the society together, in Durkheim's sense.
	* '''archaic religion''' ~~develops true cult~~ (gods, ~~priests~~, ~~sacrifice~~, divine ~~kingship~~) ~~within a hierarchically ordered~~ but still ~~monistic cosmos~~;		* '''archaic religion''' — a representation of reality as a single but now hierarchically ordered cosmos, inhabited by objectified beings "conceived as actively and sometimes willfully controlling the natural and human world... in a word they have become gods" (p. 364). Here the symbol system is still monistic ("there is still only one world") but elaborates "a vast cosmology in which all things divine and natural have a place" (p. 364), stabilized by craft literacy. The religious action this stimulates is worship and above all sacrifice — "communication systems" through which gods and men can interact (p. 365), introducing "a greater element of intentionality" but also "an increased burden of anxiety" (p. 365). Socially, religion remains largely merged with other structures, but cults multiply with social differentiation, a two-class system emerges in which noble families claim "superior religious status," and the divine king stands as "the chief link between his people and the gods" (p. 365); specialized priesthoods exist but serve "an essentially transient clientele" — still no congregation (p. 365). As for ''social implications,'' "social conformity is at every point reinforced with religious sanction" (p. 365); yet gods acting "with a certain freedom" introduce "an element of openness" (p. 365), since the fortunes of rival groups can be read as shifts of divine favor — a rationalization of political change (Israel, Homeric Greece, Chou China) that ultimately "began to place the archaic pattern itself in jeopardy" (p. 366).
	* '''historic religion''' (~~emerging across~~ the ~~Old World~~ in the first ~~millennium BC11E~~) ~~breaks through~~ to ~~transcendental dualism~~, ~~world rejection~~, ~~and22 salvation;~~		* '''historic religion''' — a representation of reality split in two, proclaiming "an entirely different realm of universal reality, having for religious man the highest value" (p. 366) and devaluing this one. The symbol system is transcendental, dualistic, and "demythologized" relative to archaic cosmology, and for the first time universalistic: man is "no longer defined chiefly in terms of what tribe or clan he comes from or what particular god he serves but rather as a being capable of salvation" — "it is for the first time possible to conceive of man as such" (p. 366). The religious action this stimulates is "above all action necessary for salvation" (p. 366): historic religion "convicts man of a basic flaw" (greed and anger; sin; heedlessness of God) and the ideal becomes separation from the world. Socially, we get for the first time differentiated religious collectivities: "the single religio-political hierarchy of archaic society tends to split into two at least partially independent hierarchies, one political and one religious" (p. 367), the roles of believer and subject become distinct, and society settles into the four-class system of the great historic civilizations. As for ''social implications,'' a new level of tension enters history: political acts "could be judged in terms of standards that the political authorities could not finally control" (prophet vs. king, pope vs. emperor), and religion comes to provide "the ideology and social cohesion for many rebellions and reform movements" — a "more dynamic and especially a more purposive role in social change" (p. 368) — while continuing for long periods to legitimate the existing order.
	* '''early modern religion''' (the ~~Protestant Reformation~~) ~~collapses~~ religious ~~hierarchy and declares~~ salvation ~~available~~ to ~~every believer~~ in worldly life; and		* '''early modern religion''' — a representation marked by "the collapse of the hierarchical structuring of both this and the other world" (p. 368). Dualism remains, but as direct confrontation: much of the cosmological baggage is dropped "as superstition," and the stress falls on faith, "an internal quality of the person," over acts marked "religious" (p. 369). The religious action this stimulates is world-affirming: "salvation is not to be found in any kind of withdrawal from the world but in the midst of worldly activities" (p. 368); indeed "religious action was now conceived to be identical with the whole of life" (p. 369), the service of God as "a total demand in every walk of life." Socially, the Reformation rejects both papal authority and the old two-level religious hierarchy, replacing it with a new two-class system of "elect and reprobates" — a vanguard group rather than a qualitative religious elite (p. 369) — while church and state lose their reified standing in favor of "a more flexible multi-centered mode of social organization based more on contract and voluntary association" (p. 370). As for ''social implications,'' "for the first time pressures to social change in the direction of greater realization of religious values are actually institutionalized as part of the structure of the society itself" (p. 370) — the self-revising, voluntaristic, democratic social order.
	* '''modern religion,''' ~~after~~ Kant, ~~collapses dualism~~ itself and ~~makes~~ the individual ~~responsible for~~ his own ~~symbolism~~.		* '''modern religion''' — a representation marked by "the collapse of the dualism that was so crucial to all the historic religions" (p. 371). After Kant, "it is not so much a question of two worlds as it is of as many worlds as there are modes of apprehending them"; "an infinitely multiplex one has replaced the simple duplex structure" (p. 371), and religion must be grounded "in the structure of the human situation itself" (p. 371). The religious action this stimulates is the search for meaning beyond any church: "the search for adequate standards of action, which is at the same time a search for personal maturity and social relevance, is in itself the heart of the modern quest for salvation" (p. 373). Socially, organization becomes radically fluid and voluntary — Thomas Paine's "My mind is my church," Jefferson's "I am a sect myself" (p. 373) — with doctrinal enforcement dropped and the church reduced to providing "a favorable environment" in which "each individual must work out his own ultimate solutions... without imposing on him a prefabricated set of answers" (p. 373). As for ''social implications,'' culture and personality themselves "have come to be viewed as endlessly revisable" (p. 373) — which can be read as the collapse of meaning, or, as Bellah argues "more fruitfully," as "unprecedented opportunities for creative innovation in every sphere of human action" (p. 374).


	Bellah insisted the stages were not inevitable, not a ranking of truth or value, and never wholly superseded — but the scheme's directional logic (compact to differentiated) and its culmination in liberal Protestant-inflected modernity drew sustained criticism for covert teleology and Eurocentrism.		Bellah insisted the stages were not inevitable, not a ranking of truth or value, and never wholly superseded — but the scheme's directional logic (compact to differentiated) and its culmination in liberal Protestant-inflected modernity drew sustained criticism for covert teleology and Eurocentrism.

Michael at 15:33, 7 November 2026

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	* '''historic religion''' (emerging across the Old World in the first millennium BC11E) breaks through to transcendental dualism, world rejection, and22 salvation;		* '''historic religion''' (emerging across the Old World in the first millennium BC11E) breaks through to transcendental dualism, world rejection, and22 salvation;
	* '''early modern religion''' (the Protestant Reformation) collapses religious hierarchy and declares salvation available to every believer in worldly life; and		* '''early modern religion''' (the Protestant Reformation) collapses religious hierarchy and declares salvation available to every believer in worldly life; and
	* '''12''' after Kant, collapses dualism itself and makes the individual responsible for his own symbolism.		* '''modern religion,''' after Kant, collapses dualism itself and makes the individual responsible for his own symbolism.

	Bellah insisted the stages were not inevitable, not a ranking of truth or value, and never wholly superseded — but the scheme's directional logic (compact to differentiated) and its culmination in liberal Protestant-inflected modernity drew sustained criticism for covert teleology and Eurocentrism.		Bellah insisted the stages were not inevitable, not a ranking of truth or value, and never wholly superseded — but the scheme's directional logic (compact to differentiated) and its culmination in liberal Protestant-inflected modernity drew sustained criticism for covert teleology and Eurocentrism.

Michael at 15:31, 7 November 2026

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	=== Initial Theory ===		=== Initial Theory ===
	In his 1964 essay "Religious Evolution," Bellah laid out his preliminary theory.<ref>Robert N. Bellah, "Religious Evolution," ''American Sociological Review'' 29, no. 3 (1964): 358–74.</ref> '''Defining religion''' as "''a set of symbolic forms and acts which relate man to the ultimate conditions of his existence''," he argued that what evolves is the religious ''symbol system'' — not God, not religious man, but the ''cultural apparatus'' ''through which humans represent ultimate reality.''		In his 1964 essay "Religious Evolution," Bellah laid out his preliminary theory.<ref>Robert N. Bellah, "Religious Evolution," ''American Sociological Review'' 29, no. 3 (1964): 358–74.</ref> '''Defining religion''' as "''a set of symbolic forms and acts which relate man [sic] to the ultimate conditions of his existence''," he argued that what evolves is the religious ''symbol system'' — not God, not religious man, but the ''cultural apparatus'' ''through which humans represent ultimate reality.''

	'''Evolution,''' for Bellah, meant "a process of increasing differentiation and complexity of organization" that endows a system with greater adaptive capacity and autonomy relative to its environment.		'''Evolution,''' for Bellah, meant "a process of increasing differentiation and complexity of organization" that endows a system with greater adaptive capacity and autonomy relative to its environment.

	'''Key questions''' for Bellah are "the kind of symbol system involved, the kind of religious action it stimulates, the kind of social organization in which this religious action occurs and the implications for social action in general..."<ref>Robert N. Bellah, “Religious Evolution,” pt. 358-274, ''Americal Sociological Review'' 29, no. 3 (1964). 361.</ref>		'''Key questions''' for Bellah are

			* what does religion represent (typically "reality")
			* "the kind of symbol system involved,
			* the kind of religious action it stimulates,
			* the kind of social organization in which this religious action occurs and"
			* the implications (social or otherwise) for social action and society in general..."<ref>Robert N. Bellah, “Religious Evolution,” pt. 358-274, ''Americal Sociological Review'' 29, no. 3 (1964). 361.</ref>

	On this basis he posited '''five ideal-typical stages''' — '''primitive,''' '''archaic,''' '''historic,''' '''early modern,''' and '''modern''' — each marked by a more differentiated symbolization:		On this basis he posited '''five ideal-typical stages''' — '''primitive,''' '''archaic,''' '''historic,''' '''early modern,''' and '''modern''' — each marked by a more differentiated symbolization:

	* '''primitive religion''', a simplistic representation of "combinations...of experience which are contingent upon [a] particular social and physical environment."<ref>Leinhart quoted in Robert N. Bellah, “Religious Evolution,” pt. 358-274, ''Americal Sociological Review'' 29, no. 3 (1964). 361.</ref> Note that the symbolic representation of experience is an advance against animals and the "pre-religious" who could only "passively endure" suffering and not "transcend and dominate" it through symbolization. Remember here, for Bellah, "religious symbolization is concerned with ~~imagine~~ the ultimate conditions of existence."<ref>Robert N. Bellah, “Religious Evolution,” pt. 358-274, ''Americal Sociological Review'' 29, no. 3 (1964). 362.</ref>		* '''primitive religion''', a simplistic representation of "combinations...of experience which are contingent upon [a] particular social and physical environment."<ref>Leinhart quoted in Robert N. Bellah, “Religious Evolution,” pt. 358-274, ''Americal Sociological Review'' 29, no. 3 (1964). 361.</ref> Note that the symbolic representation of experience is an advance against animals and the "pre-religious" who could only "passively endure" suffering and not "transcend and dominate" it through symbolization. Remember here, for Bellah, "religious symbolization is concerned with imaging the ultimate conditions of existence."<ref>Robert N. Bellah, “Religious Evolution,” pt. 358-274, ''Americal Sociological Review'' 29, no. 3 (1964). 362.</ref> Here here see that reality is being represented but through myth (the symbol system), that this myth encourages ritual (religious action). Here there is no "religious organization." "Church and society are one." As for ''social implications,'' all this helps tie the society together, in Durkheim's sense.
	* '''archaic religion''' develops true cult (gods, priests, sacrifice, divine kingship) within a hierarchically ordered but still monistic cosmos;		* '''archaic religion''' develops true cult (gods, priests, sacrifice, divine kingship) within a hierarchically ordered but still monistic cosmos;
	* '''historic religion''' (emerging across the Old World in the first millennium BC11E) breaks through to transcendental dualism, world rejection, and22 salvation;		* '''historic religion''' (emerging across the Old World in the first millennium BC11E) breaks through to transcendental dualism, world rejection, and22 salvation;

Michael at 15:15, 7 November 2026

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	==Notes==		==Notes==

	In his 1964 essay "Religious Evolution," Bellah laid out his preliminary theory.<ref>Robert N. Bellah, "Religious Evolution," ''American Sociological Review'' 29, no. 3 (1964): 358–74.</ref> Defining religion as "a set of symbolic forms and acts which relate man to the ultimate conditions of his existence," he argued that what evolves is the religious ''symbol system'' — not God, not religious man, but the cultural apparatus through which humans represent ultimate reality. Evolution, for Bellah, meant "a process of increasing differentiation and complexity of organization" that endows a system with greater adaptive capacity and autonomy relative to its environment. On this basis he posited five ideal-typical stages — primitive, archaic, historic, early modern, and modern — each marked by a more differentiated symbolization: primitive religion ~~knows~~ a ~~single mythic cosmos~~ ("the ~~Dreaming~~") ~~in which ritual participants identify with ancestral beings;~~ archaic religion develops true cult (gods, priests, sacrifice, divine kingship) within a hierarchically ordered but still monistic cosmos; historic religion (emerging across the Old World in the first millennium ~~BCE~~) breaks through to transcendental dualism, world rejection, ~~and~~ salvation; early modern religion (the Protestant Reformation) collapses religious hierarchy and declares salvation available to every believer in worldly life; and ~~modern religion,~~ after Kant, collapses dualism itself and makes the individual responsible for his own symbolism. Bellah insisted the stages were not inevitable, not a ranking of truth or value, and never wholly superseded — but the scheme's directional logic (compact to differentiated) and its culmination in liberal Protestant-inflected modernity drew sustained criticism for covert teleology and Eurocentrism.		=== Initial Theory ===
			In his 1964 essay "Religious Evolution," Bellah laid out his preliminary theory.<ref>Robert N. Bellah, "Religious Evolution," ''American Sociological Review'' 29, no. 3 (1964): 358–74.</ref> '''Defining religion''' as "''a set of symbolic forms and acts which relate man to the ultimate conditions of his existence''," he argued that what evolves is the religious ''symbol system'' — not God, not religious man, but the ''cultural apparatus'' ''through which humans represent ultimate reality.''

			'''Evolution,''' for Bellah, meant "a process of increasing differentiation and complexity of organization" that endows a system with greater adaptive capacity and autonomy relative to its environment.

			'''Key questions''' for Bellah are "the kind of symbol system involved, the kind of religious action it stimulates, the kind of social organization in which this religious action occurs and the implications for social action in general..."<ref>Robert N. Bellah, “Religious Evolution,” pt. 358-274, ''Americal Sociological Review'' 29, no. 3 (1964). 361.</ref>

			On this basis he posited '''five ideal-typical stages''' — '''primitive,''' '''archaic,''' '''historic,''' '''early modern,''' and '''modern''' — each marked by a more differentiated symbolization:

			* '''primitive religion''', a simplistic representation of "combinations...of experience which are contingent upon [a] particular social and physical environment."<ref>Leinhart quoted in Robert N. Bellah, “Religious Evolution,” pt. 358-274, ''Americal Sociological Review'' 29, no. 3 (1964). 361.</ref> Note that the symbolic representation of experience is an advance against animals and the "pre-religious" who could only "passively endure" suffering and not "transcend and dominate" it through symbolization. Remember here, for Bellah, "religious symbolization is concerned with imagine the ultimate conditions of existence."<ref>Robert N. Bellah, “Religious Evolution,” pt. 358-274, ''Americal Sociological Review'' 29, no. 3 (1964). 362.</ref>
			* '''archaic religion''' develops true cult (gods, priests, sacrifice, divine kingship) within a hierarchically ordered but still monistic cosmos;
			* '''historic religion''' (emerging across the Old World in the first millennium BC11E) breaks through to transcendental dualism, world rejection, and22 salvation;
			* '''early modern religion''' (the Protestant Reformation) collapses religious hierarchy and declares salvation available to every believer in worldly life; and
			* '''12''' after Kant, collapses dualism itself and makes the individual responsible for his own symbolism.

			Bellah insisted the stages were not inevitable, not a ranking of truth or value, and never wholly superseded — but the scheme's directional logic (compact to differentiated) and its culmination in liberal Protestant-inflected modernity drew sustained criticism for covert teleology and Eurocentrism.

	===The Revised Theory: ''Religion in Human Evolution'' (2011)===		===The Revised Theory: ''Religion in Human Evolution'' (2011)===
Line 49:		Line 64:
	! Level !! What (what is represented) !! How (how it is represented)		! Level !! What (what is represented) !! How (how it is represented)
	\|-		\|-
	! colspan="3" \| Stages of Religious Evolution (2011)		! colspan="3" \| Stages of Religious Evolution (2011) (evolution as "increasing differentiation and complexity of organization...which endows... with greater capacity..." (p. 358)
	\|-		\|-
	\| '''Tribal''' \|\| A single mythic cosmos — ancestral beings, "the Dreaming," the group as continuous with nature \|\| Mimetic and mythic: enactive ritual participation (dance, sacrifice, identification with ancestral beings) plus oral narrative myth		\| '''Tribal''' \|\| A single mythic cosmos — ancestral beings, "the Dreaming," the group as continuous with nature \|\| Mimetic and mythic: enactive ritual participation (dance, sacrifice, identification with ancestral beings) plus oral narrative myth