Human Motivation - Revision history

Michael at 15:29, 22 February 2026

2026-02-22T15:29:49Z

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	<blockquote class="definition">According to Abraham Maslow's 1943 Theory of '''Human Motivation''',<ref>Specified in Maslow, A. H. “A Theory of Human Motivation.” Psychological Review 50, no. 4 (1943): 370–96. https://doi:10.1192/bjp.bp.115.179622. and Maslow, A. H. “Preface to Motivation Theory.” Psychosomatic Medicine 5, no. 1 (1943): 85. https://doi.org/10.1097/00006842-194301000-00012</ref> humans are motivated by a set of biologically rooted needs that they are driven to fulfill. Fulfilling these needs creates healthy, happy, [[Full Realization\|fully realized]] human beings. Thwarting these needs creates miserable, diminished, neurotic and psychotic human ~~being~~.		<blockquote class="definition">Questions of Human Motivation are central to Eupsychian Theory. According to Abraham Maslow's 1943 Theory of '''Human Motivation''',<ref>Specified in Maslow, A. H. “A Theory of Human Motivation.” Psychological Review 50, no. 4 (1943): 370–96. https://doi:10.1192/bjp.bp.115.179622. and Maslow, A. H. “Preface to Motivation Theory.” Psychosomatic Medicine 5, no. 1 (1943): 85. https://doi.org/10.1097/00006842-194301000-00012</ref> humans are motivated by a set of biologically rooted needs that they are driven to fulfill. Fulfilling these needs creates healthy, happy, [[Full Realization\|fully realized]] human beings. Thwarting these needs creates miserable, diminished, neurotic and psychotic human beings.
	</blockquote>		</blockquote>

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	==Notes==		==Notes==

	In his 1943 article "Preface to Motivation Theory," Maslow rested his theory of motivation on the following thirteen propositions. Note that Maslow distinguished between "behaviour theory" and "motivation theory." "Behavior is determined by several classes of determinants, of which motivation is one..."<ref>Maslow, A. H. “Preface to Motivation Theory.” ''Psychosomatic Medicine'' 5, no. 1 (1943): 85-92. p. 90. <nowiki>https://doi.org/10.1097/00006842-194301000-0001</nowiki></ref>		=== Early Theory ===
			In his 1943 article "Preface to Motivation Theory," Maslow rested his early theory of motivation on the following thirteen propositions. Note that Maslow distinguished between "behaviour theory" and "motivation theory." "Behavior is determined by several classes of determinants, of which motivation is one..."<ref>Maslow, A. H. “Preface to Motivation Theory.” ''Psychosomatic Medicine'' 5, no. 1 (1943): 85-92. p. 90. <nowiki>https://doi.org/10.1097/00006842-194301000-0001</nowiki></ref>

	# '''Motivation is a property of the ''person''''', not a body part or isolated subsystem. When someone is hungry (or afraid, or lonely), that state alters perception, memory, emotion, thinking, and behaviour broadly—not just “stomach activity.” A motivation theory that treats drives as separable pieces will miss how changes ripple through the whole organism. John Smith is hungry, not John Smith's stomach—the entire individual is motivated, not merely a part. When hungry, a person changes holistically: perceptions shift to notice food more readily, memories favour past meals, emotions become tense, and thoughts focus on obtaining sustenance rather than abstract problems. Satisfaction likewise comes to the whole person, making reductionist approaches that isolate bodily functions theoretically and experimentally unsound.		# '''Motivation is a property of the ''person''''', not a body part or isolated subsystem. When someone is hungry (or afraid, or lonely), that state alters perception, memory, emotion, thinking, and behaviour broadly—not just “stomach activity.” A motivation theory that treats drives as separable pieces will miss how changes ripple through the whole organism. John Smith is hungry, not John Smith's stomach—the entire individual is motivated, not merely a part. When hungry, a person changes holistically: perceptions shift to notice food more readily, memories favour past meals, emotions become tense, and thoughts focus on obtaining sustenance rather than abstract problems. Satisfaction likewise comes to the whole person, making reductionist approaches that isolate bodily functions theoretically and experimentally unsound.
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	# '''Account for both integration and partial/segmental responding.''' Although the organism is typically an integrated whole, people can also show isolated habits, dissociations, and segmental responses—especially under threat or overload. Some apparent “disintegration” may reflect shallow analysis, but some is real and sometimes adaptive (saving core resources for bigger problems). Motivation theory must be able to model both unified and non-unified functioning<blockquote>Apparently the organism is most unified in its integration when it is successfully facing a major problem or a threat or emergency. But when the threat is overwhelming or when the organism is too weak or helpless to manage it, it tends to disintegrate. On the whole when life is easy and successful the organism can simultaneously do many things and .turn in many directions.... ... Furthermore it is now becoming more and more clear that such phenomena are not necessarily to be regarded as weak or bad or pathological. Rather they are often to be regarded as evidence of one of the 'most important capacities of the organism, viz., to deal with unimportant or with familiar or with easily conquered problems in a partial, specific, or segmental fashion so that the main capacities of the organism are still left free for the more important or more challenging problems that .it face<ref>Maslow, A. H. “Preface to Motivation Theory.” ''Psychosomatic Medicine'' 5, no. 1 (1943): 85-92. p. 91. Italics added. <nowiki>https://doi.org/10.1097/00006842-194301000-0001</nowiki></ref></blockquote>		# '''Account for both integration and partial/segmental responding.''' Although the organism is typically an integrated whole, people can also show isolated habits, dissociations, and segmental responses—especially under threat or overload. Some apparent “disintegration” may reflect shallow analysis, but some is real and sometimes adaptive (saving core resources for bigger problems). Motivation theory must be able to model both unified and non-unified functioning<blockquote>Apparently the organism is most unified in its integration when it is successfully facing a major problem or a threat or emergency. But when the threat is overwhelming or when the organism is too weak or helpless to manage it, it tends to disintegrate. On the whole when life is easy and successful the organism can simultaneously do many things and .turn in many directions.... ... Furthermore it is now becoming more and more clear that such phenomena are not necessarily to be regarded as weak or bad or pathological. Rather they are often to be regarded as evidence of one of the 'most important capacities of the organism, viz., to deal with unimportant or with familiar or with easily conquered problems in a partial, specific, or segmental fashion so that the main capacities of the organism are still left free for the more important or more challenging problems that .it face<ref>Maslow, A. H. “Preface to Motivation Theory.” ''Psychosomatic Medicine'' 5, no. 1 (1943): 85-92. p. 91. Italics added. <nowiki>https://doi.org/10.1097/00006842-194301000-0001</nowiki></ref></blockquote>
	#"Motivation theory is not synonymous with behavior theory."<ref>Maslow, A. H. “A Theory of Human Motivation.” ''Psychological Review'' 50, no. 4 (1943): 370–96. doi:10.1192/bjp.bp.115.179622. p. 371.</ref> Maslow distinguished between "behaviour theory" and "motivation theory." "Behavior is determined by several classes of determinants, of which motivation is one.."<ref>Maslow, A. H. “Preface to Motivation Theory.” ''Psychosomatic Medicine'' 5, no. 1 (1943): 85–92. doi:<nowiki>https://doi.org/10.1097/00006842-194301000-00012</nowiki>. p. 90.</ref>		#"Motivation theory is not synonymous with behavior theory."<ref>Maslow, A. H. “A Theory of Human Motivation.” ''Psychological Review'' 50, no. 4 (1943): 370–96. doi:10.1192/bjp.bp.115.179622. p. 371.</ref> Maslow distinguished between "behaviour theory" and "motivation theory." "Behavior is determined by several classes of determinants, of which motivation is one.."<ref>Maslow, A. H. “Preface to Motivation Theory.” ''Psychosomatic Medicine'' 5, no. 1 (1943): 85–92. doi:<nowiki>https://doi.org/10.1097/00006842-194301000-00012</nowiki>. p. 90.</ref>

			=== Eupsychian Theory ===
			Later in his career, Maslow refined his theory of motivation, providing a set of eupsychian propositions that enhanced our understanding of the species and that could help solve our [[Big Problem\|Big Problems]]. All the following quotations are from that seminal unpublished article.<ref>Maslow, Abraham H. “Beyond Spontaneity: A Critique of the Esalen Institute.” In ''Future Visions: The Unpublished Papers of Abraham Maslow'', edited by Edward Hoffman. Sage Publications, 1996. p. 96-8. <nowiki>https://us.sagepub.com/en-us/nam/future-visions/book8426</nowiki>.</ref>

			# "Every human individual has a higher nature, far better than we have ever suspected."
			# "Human beings can improve psychologically and do improve psychologically." In other words, they can heal and grow that psychology (and society) should be devoted to helping them do do exactly that.
			# Human society can be improved. "It can be improved, and it ''does'' improve" and that, as with improving human beings, the "task is up to us," and that we are up to it--that we "can learn how to accomplish this effectively," hopefully before we blow ourselves up.
			# That being healthy and "fully functioning" is better than being neurotic.
			# That "all persons have a right to actualize their [full] potential" and that human society has obligations to help them do so by, for example, eliminating "unequal opportunities" and meeting their [[Essential Needs]].
			# That "all humans compose a single species" and that because of that "it would seem to make sense that we should be able to develop a one-world kind of politics."
			# That all humans possess "certain underlying [empirically substantiated] needs and values" that, if denied, denigrated, or unfulfilled" lead to illness and [[Metapathology]].
			# That "heaven" is a state of consciousness most often experienced in "transient and brief" "peak or mystical experiences."<ref>Maslow also made some comments on how "heaven" is transient and ultimately boring, therefore it is "human nature to seek new experiences," which is correct only insofar as "normal" society is not conducive to a "heavenly state of consciousness and therefore those in this state often isolate and (necessarily) get bored. It would be much different if we built a society capable of sustaining one's "heavenly" state of consciousness, then one could have experiences in that state, experiences would I would argue would be far superior to the toxic and violence options currently on offer.</ref>

	==Abraham Maslow Index==		==Abraham Maslow Index==

Michael at 18:16, 16 February 2026

2026-02-16T18:16:57Z

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Michael at 18:10, 16 February 2026

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	=== Key Terms===		=== Key Terms===

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Michael at 14:46, 7 January 2026

2026-01-07T14:46:01Z

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Michael at 17:08, 6 January 2026

2026-01-06T17:08:11Z

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	# '''Reject atomistic “lists of drives”; motivation is hierarchical and depends on level of analysis.''' Drive lists wrongly imply equal strength, independence, and clean separability among motives. Such listings imply equal potency and probability of appearance among drives, which is incorrect since emergence depends on satisfaction of more prepotent desires. They also falsely suggest drives are isolated from one another when they actually overlap extensively, and they mix different levels of specificity indiscriminately—like combining broad needs with specific protein cravings. Drives don't form an arithmetic sum but exist in nested hierarchies where the number identified depends entirely on the degree of analytical magnification. Maslow argues motives nest inside broader categories (like boxes within boxes), so the number of “drives” you list depends on your magnification level (very general vs very specific). Proper theory distinguishes levels and treats fundamental goals as abstract categories, not a flat catalog.<blockquote>Thus we can speak of a need for gratification or equilibrium; or more specifically of a need to eat; or still more specifically of a need to fill the stomach; or still more specifically of a desire for proteins, or still more specifically of a desire for a particular protein; and so on. Too many of the listings that we now have available have combined indiscriminately needs at various levels of magnification. With such a confusion it is understandable that some lists should contain three or four needs and others contain hundreds of needs. If we wished, we could have such a list of drives contain anywhere from one to one mil- lion drives, depending entirely on the specificity of analysis. Furthermore, it should be clearly under- stood that if we attempt to discuss the fundamental desires they should be clearly understood as sets of desires, as fundamental categories or collections of desires. In other words, such an enumeration of fundamental goals would be an ''abstract classification'' rather than a cataloguing list.<ref>Maslow, A. H. “Preface to Motivation Theory.” ''Psychosomatic Medicine'' 5, no. 1 (1943): 85-92. p. 88. Italics added. <nowiki>https://doi.org/10.1097/00006842-194301000-0001</nowiki></ref></blockquote>		# '''Reject atomistic “lists of drives”; motivation is hierarchical and depends on level of analysis.''' Drive lists wrongly imply equal strength, independence, and clean separability among motives. Such listings imply equal potency and probability of appearance among drives, which is incorrect since emergence depends on satisfaction of more prepotent desires. They also falsely suggest drives are isolated from one another when they actually overlap extensively, and they mix different levels of specificity indiscriminately—like combining broad needs with specific protein cravings. Drives don't form an arithmetic sum but exist in nested hierarchies where the number identified depends entirely on the degree of analytical magnification. Maslow argues motives nest inside broader categories (like boxes within boxes), so the number of “drives” you list depends on your magnification level (very general vs very specific). Proper theory distinguishes levels and treats fundamental goals as abstract categories, not a flat catalog.<blockquote>Thus we can speak of a need for gratification or equilibrium; or more specifically of a need to eat; or still more specifically of a need to fill the stomach; or still more specifically of a desire for proteins, or still more specifically of a desire for a particular protein; and so on. Too many of the listings that we now have available have combined indiscriminately needs at various levels of magnification. With such a confusion it is understandable that some lists should contain three or four needs and others contain hundreds of needs. If we wished, we could have such a list of drives contain anywhere from one to one mil- lion drives, depending entirely on the specificity of analysis. Furthermore, it should be clearly under- stood that if we attempt to discuss the fundamental desires they should be clearly understood as sets of desires, as fundamental categories or collections of desires. In other words, such an enumeration of fundamental goals would be an ''abstract classification'' rather than a cataloguing list.<ref>Maslow, A. H. “Preface to Motivation Theory.” ''Psychosomatic Medicine'' 5, no. 1 (1943): 85-92. p. 88. Italics added. <nowiki>https://doi.org/10.1097/00006842-194301000-0001</nowiki></ref></blockquote>
	# '''Classify motivation by <u>fundamental goals</u> (“pulls”), not instigating drives (“pushes”).''' Because behaviour, conscious desire, and even the apparent goal object can each be misleading (food-seeking might be safety-seeking; sex-seeking might be esteem-seeking), they are weak foundations for classification. Maslow’s “logical exclusion” move leaves fundamental—often unconscious—goals as the most stable basis for theory. This is a central methodological claim: organize motivation theory around ends, not surface triggers.<blockquote> It is only the fundamental goal that remains constant through all the fluctuations and interchangeability of meanings that a dynamic approach forces upon psychological theorizing.... A human being having a desire for food, then be-having in the proper fashion to get it and then chewing and eating it may actually be seeking for safety rather than for food. <ref>Maslow, A. H. “Preface to Motivation Theory.” ''Psychosomatic Medicine'' 5, no. 1 (1943): 85-92. p. 89. Italics added. <nowiki>https://doi.org/10.1097/00006842-194301000-0001</nowiki></ref> </blockquote>		# '''Classify motivation by <u>fundamental goals</u> (“pulls”), not instigating drives (“pushes”).''' Because behaviour, conscious desire, and even the apparent goal object can each be misleading (food-seeking might be safety-seeking; sex-seeking might be esteem-seeking), they are weak foundations for classification. Maslow’s “logical exclusion” move leaves fundamental—often unconscious—goals as the most stable basis for theory. This is a central methodological claim: organize motivation theory around ends, not surface triggers.<blockquote> It is only the fundamental goal that remains constant through all the fluctuations and interchangeability of meanings that a dynamic approach forces upon psychological theorizing.... A human being having a desire for food, then be-having in the proper fashion to get it and then chewing and eating it may actually be seeking for safety rather than for food. <ref>Maslow, A. H. “Preface to Motivation Theory.” ''Psychosomatic Medicine'' 5, no. 1 (1943): 85-92. p. 89. Italics added. <nowiki>https://doi.org/10.1097/00006842-194301000-0001</nowiki></ref> </blockquote>
	# '''Motivation theory must be anthropocentric, not ~~animalcentric~~.''' Animal studies can help, but human motivation differs crucially because instincts fade up the phylogenetic scale and culture/learning take over. Instincts steadily disappear and are replaced by conglomerations of hereditary reflexes, drives, and extensive cultural learning. Most important, as we go up the phylogenetic scale and as the instincts drop away there is ''more and more dependence upon the culture as an adaptive tool''. Animal data can be useful only when used cautiously and analogously; monkeys are preferable to rats because human beings resemble them more closely. The exclusive reliance on animal experimentation has produced concepts (like "drive") that emerge from preoccupation with physiological needs and may not apply to higher human motivations. Humans inherit some drives, but many goal objects and behavior patterns are acquired historically and culturally. So theories built mainly on rats risk missing the most human parts of motivation (meaning, purpose, symbolic goals).		# '''Motivation theory must be anthropocentric, not animal centric.''' Animal studies can help, but human motivation differs crucially because instincts fade up the phylogenetic scale and culture/learning take over. Instincts steadily disappear and are replaced by conglomerations of hereditary reflexes, drives, and extensive cultural learning. Most important, as we go up the phylogenetic scale and as the instincts drop away there is ''more and more dependence upon the culture as an adaptive tool''. Animal data can be useful only when used cautiously and analogously; monkeys are preferable to rats because human beings resemble them more closely. The exclusive reliance on animal experimentation has produced concepts (like "drive") that emerge from preoccupation with physiological needs and may not apply to higher human motivations. Humans inherit some drives, but many goal objects and behavior patterns are acquired historically and culturally. So theories built mainly on rats risk missing the most human parts of motivation (meaning, purpose, symbolic goals).
	# '''~~Include the “field” (situation~~/~~culture) without reducing motivation to situation theory~~.''' "Human motivation rarely actualizes itself in behavior except in relation to the situation and to other people. Motivation rarely shows itself as behavior outside of context and relationships, so theory must account for environment and culture.<ref>Maslow, A. H. “Preface to Motivation Theory.” ''Psychosomatic Medicine'' 5, no. 1 (1943): 85-92. p. 90. Italics added. <nowiki>https://doi.org/10.1097/00006842-194301000-0001</nowiki></ref> But Maslow warns against treating the organism as just another object in the field; ''the ~~person partly~~, the ~~group~~, the ~~society~~, ~~creates~~ the ~~psychological field by what they value and aim~~ for.''		# '''Motivation occurs within a situational/cultural field.''' "Human motivation rarely actualizes itself in behavior except in relation to the situation and to other people. Motivation rarely shows itself as behavior outside of context and relationships, so theory must account for environment and culture.<ref>Maslow, A. H. “Preface to Motivation Theory.” ''Psychosomatic Medicine'' 5, no. 1 (1943): 85-92. p. 90. Italics added. <nowiki>https://doi.org/10.1097/00006842-194301000-0001</nowiki></ref> But Maslow warns against treating the organism as just another object in the field " We must remember that the individual partly creates his field, his barriers and his objects of value, that they must be defined partially in terms set by the particular organism in the field. "
			# '''Account for both integration and partial/segmental responding.''' Although the organism is typically an integrated whole, people can also show isolated habits, dissociations, and segmental responses—especially under threat or overload. Some apparent “disintegration” may reflect shallow analysis, but some is real and sometimes adaptive (saving core resources for bigger problems). Motivation theory must be able to model both unified and non-unified functioning<blockquote>Apparently the organism is most unified in its integration when it is successfully facing a major problem or a threat or emergency. But when the threat is overwhelming or when the organism is too weak or helpless to manage it, it tends to disintegrate. On the whole when life is easy and successful the organism can simultaneously do many things and .turn in many directions.... ... Furthermore it is now becoming more and more clear that such phenomena are not necessarily to be regarded as weak or bad or pathological. Rather they are often to be regarded as evidence of one of the 'most important capacities of the organism, viz., to deal with unimportant or with familiar or with easily conquered problems in a partial, specific, or segmental fashion so that the main capacities of the organism are still left free for the more important or more challenging problems that .it face<ref>Maslow, A. H. “Preface to Motivation Theory.” ''Psychosomatic Medicine'' 5, no. 1 (1943): 85-92. p. 91. Italics added. <nowiki>https://doi.org/10.1097/00006842-194301000-0001</nowiki></ref></blockquote>

	==Abraham Maslow Index==		==Abraham Maslow Index==

Michael at 16:57, 6 January 2026

2026-01-06T16:57:23Z

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	==Notes==		==Notes==

	In his 1943 article "Preface to Motivation Theory," Maslow rested his theory on the following thirteen propositions		In his 1943 article "Preface to Motivation Theory," Maslow rested his theory of motivation on the following thirteen propositions. Note that Maslow distinguished between "behaviour theory" and "motivation theory." "Behavior is determined by several classes of determinants, of which motivation is one..."<ref>Maslow, A. H. “Preface to Motivation Theory.” ''Psychosomatic Medicine'' 5, no. 1 (1943): 85-92. p. 90. <nowiki>https://doi.org/10.1097/00006842-194301000-0001</nowiki></ref>

	# '''Motivation is a property of the ''person''''', not a body part or isolated subsystem. When someone is hungry (or afraid, or lonely), that state alters perception, memory, emotion, thinking, and behaviour broadly—not just “stomach activity.” A motivation theory that treats drives as separable pieces will miss how changes ripple through the whole organism. John Smith is hungry, not John Smith's stomach—the entire individual is motivated, not merely a part. When hungry, a person changes holistically: perceptions shift to notice food more readily, memories favour past meals, emotions become tense, and thoughts focus on obtaining sustenance rather than abstract problems. Satisfaction likewise comes to the whole person, making reductionist approaches that isolate bodily functions theoretically and experimentally unsound.		# '''Motivation is a property of the ''person''''', not a body part or isolated subsystem. When someone is hungry (or afraid, or lonely), that state alters perception, memory, emotion, thinking, and behaviour broadly—not just “stomach activity.” A motivation theory that treats drives as separable pieces will miss how changes ripple through the whole organism. John Smith is hungry, not John Smith's stomach—the entire individual is motivated, not merely a part. When hungry, a person changes holistically: perceptions shift to notice food more readily, memories favour past meals, emotions become tense, and thoughts focus on obtaining sustenance rather than abstract problems. Satisfaction likewise comes to the whole person, making reductionist approaches that isolate bodily functions theoretically and experimentally unsound.
	# '''Don’t use hunger as the paradigm for all motivation.''' Hunger looks “simple” because it has a clearer somatic base and is easier to isolate experimentally, but that makes it a misleading model for typical human motives. Most everyday motivations (status, belonging, approval, money, love) are less localizable and more entangled with personality and culture. Maslow argues we learn ''more'' about general motivation by studying complex motives like love than by treating hunger as the master template. We should not take a localizable, somatic, partial drive as paradigm for motivation theory. Hunger is a poor model because it's unusually isolated, less common than other motivations, and has a known somatic base—features atypical of most human desires. Better paradigms would be the desire for money or especially love, which clearly demonstrate that most drives cannot be separated from the whole organism or localized to specific bodily systems or even limited to a single base need. Using hunger as the standard case leads to trivial, invalid experiments rather than tackling the difficult but important problems of holistic motivation.		# '''Don’t use hunger as the paradigm for all motivation.''' Hunger looks “simple” because it has a clearer somatic base and is easier to isolate experimentally, but that makes it a misleading model for typical human motives. Most everyday motivations (status, belonging, approval, money, love) are less localizable and more entangled with personality and culture. Maslow argues we learn ''more'' about general motivation by studying complex motives like love than by treating hunger as the master template. We should not take a localizable, somatic, partial drive as paradigm for motivation theory. Hunger is a poor model because it's unusually isolated, less common than other motivations, and has a known somatic base—features atypical of most human desires. Better paradigms would be the desire for money or especially love, which clearly demonstrate that most drives cannot be separated from the whole organism or localized to specific bodily systems or even limited to a single base need. Using hunger as the standard case leads to trivial, invalid experiments rather than tackling the difficult but important problems of holistic motivation.
	# '''Conscious desires are usually means, not ultimate ends (and unconscious motivation matters).''' Many surface wants (money, cars, clothes) function as instruments for ''deeper aims'' (security, safety, respect, love, self-worth, truth). Because those deeper aims often aren’t fully conscious, motivation theory must address unconscious goals and not just what people report at face value. In practice, this pushes theory toward interpreting “what a desire is for,” not merely cataloguing the desire. The study of motivation should stress ultimate rather than partial goals—ends rather than means to ends. Through deeper analysis, these surface desires inevitably lead to fundamental needs that require no further justification, such as love, safety, or self-esteem. Therefore motivation theory must focus on these ultimate, largely unconscious goals rather than merely cataloguing conscious wishes.<blockquote>We want money so that we may have an automobile. In tum we want an automobile because the neighbors have one and we wish not to feel inferior to them so that we can retain our own self-respect and so that we can be loved and respected by others. <ref ~~name=":0"~~>“Preface to Motivation Theory.” ''Psychosomatic Medicine'' 5, no. 1 (1943): 85-92. p. 87.</ref></blockquote>		# '''Conscious desires are usually means, not ultimate ends (and unconscious motivation matters).''' Many surface wants (money, cars, clothes) function as instruments for ''deeper aims'' (security, safety, respect, love, self-worth, truth). Because those deeper aims often aren’t fully conscious, motivation theory must address unconscious goals and not just what people report at face value. In practice, this pushes theory toward interpreting “what a desire is for,” not merely cataloguing the desire. The study of motivation should stress ultimate rather than partial goals—ends rather than means to ends. Through deeper analysis, these surface desires inevitably lead to fundamental needs that require no further justification, such as love, safety, or self-esteem. Therefore motivation theory must focus on these ultimate, largely unconscious goals rather than merely cataloguing conscious wishes.<blockquote>We want money so that we may have an automobile. In tum we want an automobile because the neighbors have one and we wish not to feel inferior to them so that we can retain our own self-respect and so that we can be loved and respected by others. <ref>Maslow, A. H. “Preface to Motivation Theory.” ''Psychosomatic Medicine'' 5, no. 1 (1943): 85-92. p. 87. https://doi.org/10.1097/00006842-194301000-0001</ref></blockquote>
	# '''Fundamental goals are more universal than the culturally shaped paths used to reach them.''' Different societies can channel the same underlying need (e.g., esteem) into very different visible behaviours (hunter, warrior, healer, ascetic). So if you classify motivation only by overt acts, you’ll mistakenly treat culturally different “routes” as different motives. Maslow’s point is that universality is more likely at the level of deep goals than at the level of specific, local desires. Also, not only conscious but also unconscious motivations must be accounted for in a theory of motivation. Since fundamental goals rarely appear directly in consciousness, sound theory cannot neglect unconscious processes that may be even more important than conscious content. Psychoanalysis demonstrates that the relationship between conscious desires and unconscious aims can be indirect or even negative, as in reaction formations where the surface desire masks its opposite. Exclusive study of conscious motivation leaves out crucial determinants of behaviour and results in incomplete, misleading theory. This one is rather important because it provides a base for unifying humanity despite widespread cultural difference! As Maslow said "...There is now sufficient anthropological evidence to indicate that the fundamental or ultimate desires of all human beings do not differ nearly as much as do their conscious everyday desires."<ref name=":0" /> In other words, deep down we are all more alike than different. Further<blockquote>It may then be that, if we think of ultimates, the one individual's desire to be a good hunter has the same dynamics and the same fundamental aim as the desire of the other individual to be a good medicine man. We may then assert that it would be more useful for psychologists to combine these two seemingly disparate conscious desires into the same category rather than to put them into different categories on purely behavioral grounds. Apparently ends- in-themselves are far more universal than the roads taken to achieve those ends, for these roads are determined locally in the specific culture.<ref ~~name="~~:0" /> </blockquote>		# '''Fundamental goals are more universal than the culturally shaped paths used to reach them.''' Different societies can channel the same underlying need (e.g., esteem) into very different visible behaviours (hunter, warrior, healer, ascetic). So if you classify motivation only by overt acts, you’ll mistakenly treat culturally different “routes” as different motives. Maslow’s point is that universality is more likely at the level of deep goals than at the level of specific, local desires. Also, not only conscious but also unconscious motivations must be accounted for in a theory of motivation. Since fundamental goals rarely appear directly in consciousness, sound theory cannot neglect unconscious processes that may be even more important than conscious content. Psychoanalysis demonstrates that the relationship between conscious desires and unconscious aims can be indirect or even negative, as in reaction formations where the surface desire masks its opposite. Exclusive study of conscious motivation leaves out crucial determinants of behaviour and results in incomplete, misleading theory. This one is rather important because it provides a base for unifying humanity despite widespread cultural difference! As Maslow said "...There is now sufficient anthropological evidence to indicate that the fundamental or ultimate desires of all human beings do not differ nearly as much as do their conscious everyday desires."<ref name=":0">“Preface to Motivation Theory.” ''Psychosomatic Medicine'' 5, no. 1 (1943): 85-92. p. 87.</ref> In other words, deep down we are all more alike than different. Further<blockquote>It may then be that, if we think of ultimates, the one individual's desire to be a good hunter has the same dynamics and the same fundamental aim as the desire of the other individual to be a good medicine man. We may then assert that it would be more useful for psychologists to combine these two seemingly disparate conscious desires into the same category rather than to put them into different categories on purely behavioral grounds. Apparently ends- in-themselves are far more universal than the roads taken to achieve those ends, for these roads are determined locally in the specific culture.<ref>Maslow, A. H. “Preface to Motivation Theory.” ''Psychosomatic Medicine'' 5, no. 1 (1943): 85-92. p. 87.</ref> </blockquote>
	# '''A single behavior/desire can express multiple motives at once.''' Acts (including sexual behaviour, symptom formation, achievement striving) are often “channels” through which ''several needs flow simultaneously''. What looks like one motive on the surface may serve safety, esteem, closeness, revenge, belonging, or multiple aims together. That’s why purely behavioral classification tends to oversimplify and misread meaning. Maslow emphasizes that it is "unusual, not usual that an act or a conscious wish has but one motivation."<ref ~~name="~~:0" /> Sexual behavior, for instance, might simultaneously serve needs for masculinity assurance, closeness, safety, love, or prestige, though consciously experienced as simply sexual. Similarly, a hysterically paralyzed arm may fulfill multiple opposing wishes for revenge, pity, love, and respect all at once. Acts typically have plural motivations, and taking them at face value arbitrarily excludes the possibility of total understanding		# '''A single behavior/desire can express multiple motives at once.''' Acts (including sexual behaviour, symptom formation, achievement striving) are often “channels” through which ''several needs flow simultaneously''. What looks like one motive on the surface may serve safety, esteem, closeness, revenge, belonging, or multiple aims together. That’s why purely behavioral classification tends to oversimplify and misread meaning. Maslow emphasizes that it is "unusual, not usual that an act or a conscious wish has but one motivation."<ref>Maslow, A. H. “Preface to Motivation Theory.” ''Psychosomatic Medicine'' 5, no. 1 (1943): 85-92. p. 87.</ref> Sexual behavior, for instance, might simultaneously serve needs for masculinity assurance, closeness, safety, love, or prestige, though consciously experienced as simply sexual. Similarly, a hysterically paralyzed arm may fulfill multiple opposing wishes for revenge, pity, love, and respect all at once. Acts typically have plural motivations, and taking them at face value arbitrarily excludes the possibility of total understanding
	# '''Motivation is constant and woven into nearly every organismic state.''' Maslow argues motivation is not a rare “special state” that switches on occasionally; it’s continuous, fluctuating, and complex. Even states like feeling rejected are inherently motivating because they generate cascades of striving, defense, hostility, and repair attempts. A sound theory treats “what is happening in the organism” as inherently directional and goal-linked. A static statement like "this person feels rejected" only begins the analysis—a dynamic psychology must add countless statements about the motivational consequences that automatically follow: tension, unhappiness, compulsive desires to regain affection, defensive efforts, hostility accumulation. The feeling itself generates new motivational processes, making motivation constant, fluctuating, and complex rather than a special, qualitatively distinct state. Every organismic condition, both somatic and psychic, carries motivational implications.		# '''Motivation is constant and woven into nearly every organismic state.''' Maslow argues motivation is not a rare “special state” that switches on occasionally; it’s continuous, fluctuating, and complex. Even states like feeling rejected are inherently motivating because they generate cascades of striving, defense, hostility, and repair attempts. A sound theory treats “what is happening in the organism” as inherently directional and goal-linked. A static statement like "this person feels rejected" only begins the analysis—a dynamic psychology must add countless statements about the motivational consequences that automatically follow: tension, unhappiness, compulsive desires to regain affection, defensive efforts, hostility accumulation. The feeling itself generates new motivational processes, making motivation constant, fluctuating, and complex rather than a special, qualitatively distinct state. Every organismic condition, both somatic and psychic, carries motivational implications.
	# '''Humans are perpetually wanting; needs interact and tend to form a hierarchy of prepotency.''' Satisfaction is usually partial and temporary; when one desire is met, another comes forward. Importantly, which need appears depends on what’s already (relatively) ~~satisfied—creative~~ or “higher” strivings presuppose some baseline of safety, belonging, etc. This ~~requires studying motivations~~ as an ~~interdependent system~~ rather than ~~isolated episodes~~		# '''Humans are perpetually wanting; needs interact and tend to form a hierarchy of prepotency.''' Satisfaction is usually partial and temporary; when one desire is met, another comes forward. Importantly, which need appears depends on what’s already (relatively) satisfied or what is in the process of being thwarted. —creative or “higher” strivings presuppose some baseline of safety, belonging, etc. The appearance of a need rests on prior situations and other prepotent needs. As one desire is satisfied, another pops up to take its place in an endless sequence throughout life. Wants arrange themselves in shifting hierarchies of prepotency (consider Maslow's nested boxes metaphor here), and higher-level desires (for music, mathematics, home decoration) only emerge when more fundamental needs have attained relative satisfaction, not because the need is not active, but because the energy will not be there for its satisfaction. You can't learn to play an instrument when your entire week taken up with work. You can't make your house look pretty if you're too poor to buy pretty things. This hierarchical arrangement and constant emergence of new desires makes atomistic study of isolated motivational units theoretically inadequate.<blockquote>We should never have the desire to compose music or create mathematical systems, or to adorn our homes, or to be well dressed if our stomachs were empty most of the time, or if we were continually dying of thirst, or if we were continually threatened by an always impending catastrophe, or if everyone hated us.<ref>Maslow, A. H. “Preface to Motivation Theory.” ''Psychosomatic Medicine'' 5, no. 1 (1943): 85-92. p. 88.</ref></blockquote>
			# '''Reject atomistic “lists of drives”; motivation is hierarchical and depends on level of analysis.''' Drive lists wrongly imply equal strength, independence, and clean separability among motives. Such listings imply equal potency and probability of appearance among drives, which is incorrect since emergence depends on satisfaction of more prepotent desires. They also falsely suggest drives are isolated from one another when they actually overlap extensively, and they mix different levels of specificity indiscriminately—like combining broad needs with specific protein cravings. Drives don't form an arithmetic sum but exist in nested hierarchies where the number identified depends entirely on the degree of analytical magnification. Maslow argues motives nest inside broader categories (like boxes within boxes), so the number of “drives” you list depends on your magnification level (very general vs very specific). Proper theory distinguishes levels and treats fundamental goals as abstract categories, not a flat catalog.<blockquote>Thus we can speak of a need for gratification or equilibrium; or more specifically of a need to eat; or still more specifically of a need to fill the stomach; or still more specifically of a desire for proteins, or still more specifically of a desire for a particular protein; and so on. Too many of the listings that we now have available have combined indiscriminately needs at various levels of magnification. With such a confusion it is understandable that some lists should contain three or four needs and others contain hundreds of needs. If we wished, we could have such a list of drives contain anywhere from one to one mil- lion drives, depending entirely on the specificity of analysis. Furthermore, it should be clearly under- stood that if we attempt to discuss the fundamental desires they should be clearly understood as sets of desires, as fundamental categories or collections of desires. In other words, such an enumeration of fundamental goals would be an ''abstract classification'' rather than a cataloguing list.<ref>Maslow, A. H. “Preface to Motivation Theory.” ''Psychosomatic Medicine'' 5, no. 1 (1943): 85-92. p. 88. Italics added. <nowiki>https://doi.org/10.1097/00006842-194301000-0001</nowiki></ref></blockquote>
			# '''Classify motivation by <u>fundamental goals</u> (“pulls”), not instigating drives (“pushes”).''' Because behaviour, conscious desire, and even the apparent goal object can each be misleading (food-seeking might be safety-seeking; sex-seeking might be esteem-seeking), they are weak foundations for classification. Maslow’s “logical exclusion” move leaves fundamental—often unconscious—goals as the most stable basis for theory. This is a central methodological claim: organize motivation theory around ends, not surface triggers.<blockquote> It is only the fundamental goal that remains constant through all the fluctuations and interchangeability of meanings that a dynamic approach forces upon psychological theorizing.... A human being having a desire for food, then be-having in the proper fashion to get it and then chewing and eating it may actually be seeking for safety rather than for food. <ref>Maslow, A. H. “Preface to Motivation Theory.” ''Psychosomatic Medicine'' 5, no. 1 (1943): 85-92. p. 89. Italics added. <nowiki>https://doi.org/10.1097/00006842-194301000-0001</nowiki></ref> </blockquote>
			# '''Motivation theory must be anthropocentric, not animalcentric.''' Animal studies can help, but human motivation differs crucially because instincts fade up the phylogenetic scale and culture/learning take over. Instincts steadily disappear and are replaced by conglomerations of hereditary reflexes, drives, and extensive cultural learning. Most important, as we go up the phylogenetic scale and as the instincts drop away there is ''more and more dependence upon the culture as an adaptive tool''. Animal data can be useful only when used cautiously and analogously; monkeys are preferable to rats because human beings resemble them more closely. The exclusive reliance on animal experimentation has produced concepts (like "drive") that emerge from preoccupation with physiological needs and may not apply to higher human motivations. Humans inherit some drives, but many goal objects and behavior patterns are acquired historically and culturally. So theories built mainly on rats risk missing the most human parts of motivation (meaning, purpose, symbolic goals).
			# '''Include the “field” (situation/culture) without reducing motivation to situation theory.''' "Human motivation rarely actualizes itself in behavior except in relation to the situation and to other people. Motivation rarely shows itself as behavior outside of context and relationships, so theory must account for environment and culture.<ref>Maslow, A. H. “Preface to Motivation Theory.” ''Psychosomatic Medicine'' 5, no. 1 (1943): 85-92. p. 90. Italics added. <nowiki>https://doi.org/10.1097/00006842-194301000-0001</nowiki></ref> But Maslow warns against treating the organism as just another object in the field; ''the person partly, the group, the society, creates the psychological field by what they value and aim for.''

	==Abraham Maslow Index==		==Abraham Maslow Index==

Michael at 16:16, 6 January 2026

2026-01-06T16:16:48Z

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	In his 1943 article "Preface to Motivation Theory," Maslow rested his theory on the following thirteen propositions		In his 1943 article "Preface to Motivation Theory," Maslow rested his theory on the following thirteen propositions

			# '''Motivation is a property of the ''person''''', not a body part or isolated subsystem. When someone is hungry (or afraid, or lonely), that state alters perception, memory, emotion, thinking, and behaviour broadly—not just “stomach activity.” A motivation theory that treats drives as separable pieces will miss how changes ripple through the whole organism. John Smith is hungry, not John Smith's stomach—the entire individual is motivated, not merely a part. When hungry, a person changes holistically: perceptions shift to notice food more readily, memories favour past meals, emotions become tense, and thoughts focus on obtaining sustenance rather than abstract problems. Satisfaction likewise comes to the whole person, making reductionist approaches that isolate bodily functions theoretically and experimentally unsound.
			# '''Don’t use hunger as the paradigm for all motivation.''' Hunger looks “simple” because it has a clearer somatic base and is easier to isolate experimentally, but that makes it a misleading model for typical human motives. Most everyday motivations (status, belonging, approval, money, love) are less localizable and more entangled with personality and culture. Maslow argues we learn ''more'' about general motivation by studying complex motives like love than by treating hunger as the master template. We should not take a localizable, somatic, partial drive as paradigm for motivation theory. Hunger is a poor model because it's unusually isolated, less common than other motivations, and has a known somatic base—features atypical of most human desires. Better paradigms would be the desire for money or especially love, which clearly demonstrate that most drives cannot be separated from the whole organism or localized to specific bodily systems or even limited to a single base need. Using hunger as the standard case leads to trivial, invalid experiments rather than tackling the difficult but important problems of holistic motivation.
			# '''Conscious desires are usually means, not ultimate ends (and unconscious motivation matters).''' Many surface wants (money, cars, clothes) function as instruments for ''deeper aims'' (security, safety, respect, love, self-worth, truth). Because those deeper aims often aren’t fully conscious, motivation theory must address unconscious goals and not just what people report at face value. In practice, this pushes theory toward interpreting “what a desire is for,” not merely cataloguing the desire. The study of motivation should stress ultimate rather than partial goals—ends rather than means to ends. Through deeper analysis, these surface desires inevitably lead to fundamental needs that require no further justification, such as love, safety, or self-esteem. Therefore motivation theory must focus on these ultimate, largely unconscious goals rather than merely cataloguing conscious wishes.<blockquote>We want money so that we may have an automobile. In tum we want an automobile because the neighbors have one and we wish not to feel inferior to them so that we can retain our own self-respect and so that we can be loved and respected by others. <ref name=":0">“Preface to Motivation Theory.” ''Psychosomatic Medicine'' 5, no. 1 (1943): 85-92. p. 87.</ref></blockquote>
			# '''Fundamental goals are more universal than the culturally shaped paths used to reach them.''' Different societies can channel the same underlying need (e.g., esteem) into very different visible behaviours (hunter, warrior, healer, ascetic). So if you classify motivation only by overt acts, you’ll mistakenly treat culturally different “routes” as different motives. Maslow’s point is that universality is more likely at the level of deep goals than at the level of specific, local desires. Also, not only conscious but also unconscious motivations must be accounted for in a theory of motivation. Since fundamental goals rarely appear directly in consciousness, sound theory cannot neglect unconscious processes that may be even more important than conscious content. Psychoanalysis demonstrates that the relationship between conscious desires and unconscious aims can be indirect or even negative, as in reaction formations where the surface desire masks its opposite. Exclusive study of conscious motivation leaves out crucial determinants of behaviour and results in incomplete, misleading theory. This one is rather important because it provides a base for unifying humanity despite widespread cultural difference! As Maslow said "...There is now sufficient anthropological evidence to indicate that the fundamental or ultimate desires of all human beings do not differ nearly as much as do their conscious everyday desires."<ref name=":0" /> In other words, deep down we are all more alike than different. Further<blockquote>It may then be that, if we think of ultimates, the one individual's desire to be a good hunter has the same dynamics and the same fundamental aim as the desire of the other individual to be a good medicine man. We may then assert that it would be more useful for psychologists to combine these two seemingly disparate conscious desires into the same category rather than to put them into different categories on purely behavioral grounds. Apparently ends- in-themselves are far more universal than the roads taken to achieve those ends, for these roads are determined locally in the specific culture.<ref name=":0" /> </blockquote>
			# '''A single behavior/desire can express multiple motives at once.''' Acts (including sexual behaviour, symptom formation, achievement striving) are often “channels” through which ''several needs flow simultaneously''. What looks like one motive on the surface may serve safety, esteem, closeness, revenge, belonging, or multiple aims together. That’s why purely behavioral classification tends to oversimplify and misread meaning. Maslow emphasizes that it is "unusual, not usual that an act or a conscious wish has but one motivation."<ref name=":0" /> Sexual behavior, for instance, might simultaneously serve needs for masculinity assurance, closeness, safety, love, or prestige, though consciously experienced as simply sexual. Similarly, a hysterically paralyzed arm may fulfill multiple opposing wishes for revenge, pity, love, and respect all at once. Acts typically have plural motivations, and taking them at face value arbitrarily excludes the possibility of total understanding
			# '''Motivation is constant and woven into nearly every organismic state.''' Maslow argues motivation is not a rare “special state” that switches on occasionally; it’s continuous, fluctuating, and complex. Even states like feeling rejected are inherently motivating because they generate cascades of striving, defense, hostility, and repair attempts. A sound theory treats “what is happening in the organism” as inherently directional and goal-linked. A static statement like "this person feels rejected" only begins the analysis—a dynamic psychology must add countless statements about the motivational consequences that automatically follow: tension, unhappiness, compulsive desires to regain affection, defensive efforts, hostility accumulation. The feeling itself generates new motivational processes, making motivation constant, fluctuating, and complex rather than a special, qualitatively distinct state. Every organismic condition, both somatic and psychic, carries motivational implications.
			# '''Humans are perpetually wanting; needs interact and tend to form a hierarchy of prepotency.''' Satisfaction is usually partial and temporary; when one desire is met, another comes forward. Importantly, which need appears depends on what’s already (relatively) satisfied—creative or “higher” strivings presuppose some baseline of safety, belonging, etc. This requires studying motivations as an interdependent system rather than isolated episodes

	~~===Proposition===~~
	==Abraham Maslow Index==		==Abraham Maslow Index==

Michael at 15:42, 6 January 2026

2026-01-06T15:42:54Z

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	{{navmenu}}		{{navmenu}}
	<h1 class="customtitle">{{FULLPAGENAME}}</h1>		<h1 class="customtitle">{{FULLPAGENAME}}</h1>
	<blockquote class="definition">'''Human ~~Nature~~'''		<blockquote class="definition">According to Abraham Maslow's 1943 Theory of '''Human Motivation''',<ref>Specified in Maslow, A. H. “A Theory of Human Motivation.” Psychological Review 50, no. 4 (1943): 370–96. https://doi:10.1192/bjp.bp.115.179622. and Maslow, A. H. “Preface to Motivation Theory.” Psychosomatic Medicine 5, no. 1 (1943): 85. https://doi.org/10.1097/00006842-194301000-00012</ref> humans are motivated by a set of biologically rooted needs that they are driven to fulfill. Fulfilling these needs creates healthy, happy, [[Full Realization\|fully realized]] human beings. Thwarting these needs creates miserable, diminished, neurotic and psychotic human being.

	</blockquote>		</blockquote>

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	\|format=ul}}		\|format=ul}}

	[[~~Human Nature~~]] > {{#ask:[[Is a key term::~~Human Nature~~]]\|format=ul}}		[[Eupsychian Theory]] {{#ask:[[Is a key term::Eupsychian Theory]]\|format=ul}}

	[[Human Motivation]] > {{#ask:[[Is a key term::Human Motivation]]\|format=ul\|sort=Has sort motivation}}		[[Human Motivation]] > {{#ask:[[Is a key term::Human Motivation]]\|format=ul\|sort=Has sort motivation}}
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	==Notes==		==Notes==

			In his 1943 article "Preface to Motivation Theory," Maslow rested his theory on the following thirteen propositions


			===Proposition===
	==Abraham Maslow Index==		==Abraham Maslow Index==

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	[[category:lightningpath]]		[[category:lightningpath]]
	[[Is a term::Abraham Maslow\| ]]		[[Is a term::Abraham Maslow\| ]]
	[[Is a key term::~~Human Nature~~\| ]]		[[Is a key term::Eupsychian Theory\| ]]

Michael at 16:59, 27 December 2025

2025-12-27T16:59:12Z

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	[[Human Motivation]] > {{#ask:[[Is a key term::Human Motivation]]\|format=ul\|sort=Has sort motivation}}		[[Human Motivation]] > {{#ask:[[Is a key term::Human Motivation]]\|format=ul\|sort=Has sort motivation}}

	~~===Key Terms===~~

	~~[[Human Motivation]] > {{#ask:[[Is a key term::Human Motivation]]}}~~

	===Related LP Terms===		===Related LP Terms===

Michael at 16:46, 27 December 2025

2025-12-27T16:46:47Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 16:46, 27 December 2025
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	==Notes==		==Notes==
	~~Abraham Maslow divided human motivation into two categories, [[D-Realm]] motivations and [[B-Realm]] motivations.~~

	~~People motivated by~~

	==Abraham Maslow Index==		==Abraham Maslow Index==